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Abstract 
This dissertation consists of three essays in the field of household and family economics. 
Specifically, the research focuses on the optimal taxation and household behavior, gender 
inequality in the labor market during economics transition, and fertility choices and female labor 
supply. 
Chapter 1 explores the welfare implications of an optimal tax-transfer schedule to dual-
earner couples. A non-cooperative model is used to examine labor supply decisions of married 
couples to both individual- and joint-based taxation, and the results suggest that the impact of 
income taxation on family labor supply is largely dependent on spouses’ relative wage income. I 
also investigate the welfare effect of a governmental imposed redistributive program on both 
spouses, the simulation results of moving from individual to joint taxation improves both spouses’ 
well-beings and the welfare gain is higher for couples when income gap between the husband and 
the wife is larger. 
Chapter 2 empirically examines the impact of privatization reform on gender wage gap in 
urban labor market based on a comprehensive nationwide survey, the Chinese Household Income 
Projects (CHIP).  We observe, between 1995 and 2007, the gender wage gap rises, and the progress 
of privatization increases women’s productivity. The results of decomposition suggest that the 
increase in gender discrimination, which is associated with the rapid growth of non-state sector, 
contributes to widening gender wage gap. Although privatization increase gender segregation in 
occupational attainments, it is less obvious that segregation can account for the gender wage gap.  
In Chapter 3, using the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY79), we find mothers earn less on average even after controlling for other wage 
determinants. The wage penalty associated with motherhood is insignificant in the early career, 
  
and arises partly due to mothers accumulating less work experience. As a result, late mothers 
experience stronger (weaker) returns to work experience before (after) their transition to 
motherhood. The differentials in returns to work experience are robust to controlling for 
occupational skill requirements and time spent out of employment. 
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1 
Individual vs. Joint Taxation for Dual Earner Altruistic 
Households with Independent Time Allocation Decisions  
1.1  Introduction 
The appropriate tax treatment of family’s personal income is one of the most controversial 
areas in practice of income tax. Under present law, the United States uses a system of joint taxation 
where married couples are taxed as a unit and family income tax is based on their total taxable 
income.1 On the contrary, most countries use individual taxation, also known as separate taxation, 
taxing each person on his or her own income regardless of marital status.2 
Whether married couples are taxed jointly or separately is a topic of much debate. A major 
criticism of the US system is that it does not treat married couples and single individuals in the 
same way, or “marriage neutral”, in that a married couples may have different tax burden than two 
single persons. Some couples face marriage penalties, paying a higher tax bill if married than if 
single. Others enjoy marriage bonuses, paying less if married. Even though joint taxation lacks 
marriage neutrality, it provides horizontal equity, and married couples with the same income face 
the same tax liability, regardless of how income is divided between the spouses.3 Another criticism 
is that joint taxation discourages non-working spouse from undertaking paid employment, because 
it increases marginal tax rate faced by secondary earner within a couple. According to Ramsey 
rule, tax rate on primary earners’ income should be higher than the tax rate on secondary earners’ 
income if the labor supply of secondary workers is more elastic. Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) 
                                                 
1
 Although married couples are permitted to file separately under current law, the applicable rate schedule is so 
disadvantage that only 1.3% of married couples do so (Yale Law Journal 1981). 
2 Alm and Melnik (2005) report that the U.S. is the only one in OECD countries to use joint taxation. 
3 O’ Neill (1981) describes the trade-offs between marriage neutrality and horizontal equity inherent in the choice 
between individual and joint taxation. 
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simulate optimal tax rates for married couples, and their results show that optimal rates on primary 
earners can be two to three times as large as that on secondary workers. For such reason, they 
argue that joint filing system of taxing both spouses’ earnings at the same marginal tax rate is 
economically inefficient compared to a system with lower tax rates on the secondary earners. This 
paper examines how individual and joint taxation affect spouses’ labor supply over market work 
and home production. I find that the conventional wisdom in favor of individual-based taxation is 
delicate and joint taxation could improve both spouses’ welfare of both if they fail to behave 
cooperatively. 
In this study, family decision making is modeled in a non-cooperative setting, and the 
assumption of non-cooperation can be justified on both theoretical and empirical viewpoints. First, 
when the transaction costs associated with the implementation and enforcement of cooperative 
agreements within marriage are sufficiently high, it will be optimal for a couple to remain at a non-
cooperative solution (Pollak 1985). Second, the equilibrium outcome in a cooperative model 
depends crucially on what happens in the event of disagreement, variously known as the “threat 
point” or “status quo”. The seminal contributions in the cooperative bargaining literature are 
Manser and Brown (1980), and McElroy and Horney (1981). Both studies use divorce as the threat 
point. Lundberg and Pollak (1993) have developed models where the threat point is some form of 
non-cooperative behavior. Their studies all suggest that non-cooperation within marriage is the 
best choice of threat point, thus understanding of non-cooperative models is a prerequisite for 
understanding cooperative bargaining models. Furthermore, the empirical study of Del Boca and 
Flinn (2014) shows one fourth of households behaves non-cooperatively. Another study of Jia 
(2005) empirically examines labor supply of retiring couples and concludes that more than one-
half of households behaves according to a non-cooperative family decision-making model. Non-
3 
cooperation implies that there is an additional distortion of the primary-secondary labor input ratio 
in household production (Piggott and Whalley 1996). In a model with market and household 
production and with primary and secondary labor, individual-based income taxes change the 
shadow wage of each labor type in household activities and, hence, distort input decisions into 
household production for primary and secondary workers. Whether the costs of this distortion from 
individual taxation outweigh the benefits of setting different tax rates for individual household 
members depends on market labor supply elasticities. 
To precede the analysis, I first present a two-stage non-cooperative game. In the first stage of 
the game, the government determines optimal tax rates in order to maximize total tax revenue for 
a representative household. In the second stage of the game, household members simultaneously 
decide on their time-allocation between market work and home production in order to maximize 
their respective utility functions. Then I use numerical estimation method since an analytical 
comparison across tax units is not tractable. The estimated results show that a switch from an 
individual- to a joint- basis can lead to higher utility of both spouses conditional on market values 
of labor supply and marginal household productivity. The welfare gain is positively related to 
intra-household altruistic preference. The higher degree of altruism is, the larger the welfare gain. 
Altruistic preference largely affects time allocation decisions of spouse, though its impact on labor 
supply is subject to taxation. The labor supply elasticity of primary earner is higher, under 
individual taxation, with respect to changes of altruism, relative to join taxation. On the contrary, 
the labor supply of secondary earner is more elastic to changes of altruism under joint taxation 
compared to individual taxation. I also examine the effect of intra-family transfer on household 
behavior. Under joint taxation, the impact of intra-family transfer on spouse’s labor supply 
depends on family wage structure. A higher transfer increases primary earner’s labor supply only 
4 
if spouse’s wage rate is sufficiently high. On the contrary, a higher transfer increases the labor 
supply of secondary earner only if the spouse’s wage rate is sufficiently low. Under individual 
taxation, intra-family transfer has little on both spouse labor supply decisions. Numerical estimates 
show that the use of intra-family transfer can be welfare-improving for spouses with disparate 
incomes. 
Even though couples may act non-cooperatively, they make decisions that are not entirely 
self-interested. They voluntarily anticipate what they think to be the preferences of others and 
incorporate them into their decision making. They do this, not because of legal requirements or 
social norms, but because they are altruistic and care about the welfare of others (Bell and Keeney, 
2009). There are two reasons to incorporate altruistic preferences in non-cooperative models. First, 
it enhances our understanding on whole continuum of household decision models that are situated 
between the fully cooperative model and the fully non-cooperative model without caring. 
Cherchye et al. (2011) present a consumption model of caring household members when they 
make non-cooperative decisions over public goods consumption. Following a revealed preference 
approach, they derive a testable implication of the model for empirical data. Their experimental 
applications suggest the empirical relevance of non-cooperative behavior and altruistic preference 
in household decision making. Second, households with different intra-family non-cooperative and 
altruistic preferences may achieve different equilibrium. Indeed, economists have long recognized 
the importance of altruistic preference in household behavior. However, previous studies mainly 
focus on the interaction of altruism and consumption and resource reallocation within family 
(Becker and Barro 1986; Stark and Falk 1998). To my knowledge, there have been no studies 
conducted on the effect of altruistic preferences, non-cooperative behavior and income tax. It is 
more informative for policy makers to measure welfare gain and loss originating from non-
5 
cooperative behavior and altruistic preference determining optimal income taxation and 
redistributive policies. This study provides a quantitative measurement of altruistic preference on 
labor supply decision and household welfare. 
This paper is also related to the theoretical literature on family taxation, which provides two 
distinct arguments in favor of individual taxation. Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) draw on labor 
supply elasticity considerations alone to support individual taxation. The standard labor supply 
elasticity argument to replace joint by individual taxation remains true even if the endogeneity of 
fertility is taken into account (Meier and Wrede 2011). Optimal income tax theory in the Ramsey 
tradition calls for separate taxation where women should be taxed at lower rates than men or that 
marginal taxation of one individual decreases in the income of the spouse (Apps and Rees 2011; 
Kleven et al. 2009; Alesina et al. 2011). Apps and Rees (2011) emphasizing household production 
indicate that joint taxation fares worse than individual taxation, because the shadow income of 
household production always remains untaxed, and higher welfare losses are associated with joint 
taxation because marginal tax rates are increasing in the income of the spouse. Miere and Rainer 
(2012) suggest that tax-induced labor supply distortions lead to over provision of the family public 
good, spouses’ failure to internalize the collective effect of their choices points towards under 
provision. They find that a move from individual to joint taxation improves the welfare of both 
spouses. I see my results as complementary to their findings, whereas their paper focuses on single 
earner households. I show that joint taxation is also optimal for dual earner households, especially 
for couples with unequal incomes. 
Empirical studies use policy changes to estimate the effects of moving from joint to individual 
taxation on labor supply decision. Gustafsson (1992) compares the labor supply of women in 
Sweden and Germany. The analysis suggests that the participation rate of Swedish wives who face 
6 
the individual taxation would fall by one fourth if the German system of joint taxation was adopted. 
Lalumia (2008) uses a quasi-experiment from the time of the U.S. conversion from separate to 
joint taxation. She points out tax change is associated with two percentage points decline in the 
employment rate of highly educated married women. In line with their studies, the simulated 
results show that a shift to joint taxation reduces wives’ labor supply, particularly among the 
households with high earnings husbands. However, I see very little changes in labor supply of 
equal earner couples. I also find that higher welfare gain of moving from individual to joint 
taxation is associated with larger income gap between spouses. The present study also explores 
and investigates the importance of a governmental imposed income transfer program in family 
behavior. I find that the effects of this program on family labor supply decisions vary across 
different tax treatments. The impacts of such income re-distributive program on household’s 
decisions are shown to vary by taxation. Under joint taxation, when the husband receives larger 
transfer share, he would supply more to home production and less to market work if his relative 
income is sufficiently low. When the wife gets larger share, she would supply less to home 
production and more to market work when her relative income is high. When the wife gets larger 
share, she would supply less to home production and more to market work when her relative 
income is high. On the contrary, under individual taxation, the transfer program has little impact 
on the labor supply decisions for both spouses. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 lays out the analytical 
framework of altruistic spouses when they make their time-allocation decisions independently. 
The theoretical results are discussed in section 1.3. Section 1.4 presents numerical estimation 
results. Section 1.5 elaborates on an extension in which no transfer program is presented. Section 
1.6 concludes. 
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1.2  Household Decisions with Intra-Family Transfers 
1.2.1 Household Decision Making Model 
Consider a simple economy that is composed of representative households where each 
household has two members (𝑖), husband (𝑚) and wife (𝑓). Each family member allocates one 
unit of time endowment over labor market activities (𝐿𝑖) and home production (𝑔𝑖). I assume the 
utility of each member takes the following functional form (see Konrad and Lommerud, 2000):  
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝜃 ∙ 𝐺 − 𝑎(𝑔𝑖), 
where 𝑥𝑖  is individual’s private consumption, G is the consumption on family public goods,  𝜃 
indicates the marginal utility of the household public good to each spouse, and 𝑎(𝑔𝑖) represents 
the utility costs associated with time contributing to the production of family goods. 
The private consumption on good 𝑥𝑖 is determined by individual i′s disposable income, 
𝑥𝑖 = (1 − 𝜏𝑖)𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖 + 𝜌𝑖𝑇, 
where 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖  labor income with wage rate 𝑤𝑖 is exogenously determined; 𝜏𝑖 is marginal tax rate and 
subject to different taxation. Another income source for family members comes from interfamily 
income transfer, imposed by the government, equals to a portion 𝜌𝑖 of household’s tax liability(T). 
The calculation of household tax liability is subject to income tax scheme, and the amount varies 
from individual- to joint-based taxation. One possible example of this transfer policy is tax refund 
of the United States.4 For simplicity, I assume that full amount of taxes are refunded to household 
and divided between two spouses. Suppose that the husband receives 𝜌 portion, the wife receives 
the rest or (1 − 𝜌) portion of the transfer. 
                                                 
4 A tax refund or tax rebate is a refund on taxes when the tax liability is less than the taxes paid. Taxpayers can often 
get a tax refund on their income tax if the tax they owe is less than the total amount they paid. 
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The family public goods 𝐺 include any situation which requires the joint performance of the 
spouses (e.g. raising the children or the maintenance of the home), but it excludes the possibility 
that the provision of the family good would be obtained in the market. This assumption is 
reasonable because it takes into consideration that, for some couples, the private provision of 
family goods cannot substitute their own contribution to the family goods. The family public goods 
are described by the sum of individual time contributed to family production,  
𝐺 = ∑ 𝑔𝑖 = (𝑔𝑚 + 𝑔𝑓). 
In line with Konrad and Lommerud (2000), I suppose that individuals increasingly dislike 
spending more time on the production of family goods. The contribution to family goods not only 
reduces the time available to the labor market but also has utility or psychological cost 𝑎(𝑔𝑖), 
which is represented by an quadratic function, 
𝑎(𝑔𝑖) =
1
2
𝐶𝑖𝑔𝑖
2, 
where 𝐶𝑚 = 𝛼 for the husband (m) and 𝐶𝑓 = 𝛽 for the wife (f). 
In contrast to self-centered preferences, spouses are assumed to be altruistic, care about each 
other. The level of individual’s well-being depends on his or her own individual (egocentric) utility 
as well as the utility of the spouse. Each spouse’s preference is represented by altruistic 
function 𝑍𝑖. To keep the model tractable, I assume the altruistic function is additive and described 
by,5  
 𝑍𝑖 = 𝑈𝑖 + 𝛿𝑈−𝑖.  
Where 𝛿 describes the scaling factor and takes the value between 0 and 1, reflecting the altruism 
that individual 𝑖 feels for his or her spouse. 
                                                 
5 Bell and Keeney (2009) discuss different specification of altruistic utility function. 
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That is to say, the altruistic functions  𝑍𝑖  for husband (𝑚) and wife (𝑓) are represented by, 
 𝑍𝑚 = 𝑈𝑚 + 𝛿𝑈𝑓 = 𝑥𝑚 + 𝜃(𝑔𝑚 + 𝑔𝑓) −
1
2
𝛼𝑔𝑚
2 + 𝛿 [𝑥𝑓 + 𝜃(𝑔𝑚 + 𝑔𝑓) −
1
2
𝛽𝑔𝑓
2], 
 𝑍𝑓 = 𝑈𝑓 + 𝛿𝑈𝑚 = 𝑥𝑓 + 𝜃(𝑔𝑚 + 𝑔𝑓) −
1
2
𝛽𝑔𝑓
2 + 𝛿 [𝑥𝑚 + 𝜃(𝑔𝑚 + 𝑔𝑓) −
1
2
𝛼𝑔𝑚
2 ]. 
One of the main reasons I choose to work with the special functional form above is for 
simplicity. With linearity, the Nash solution in equilibrium takes on a simple but appealing form. 
In addition, utility as specified also makes strategic interaction between spouses simple. Because 
even though their utilities are intertwined through the existence of a family public good, each 
partner’s behavior is still independent when the spouses act non-cooperatively. This simplicity 
makes the non-cooperative outcome a “clearer” benchmark for understanding the family’s decision 
making (Funcia et al. 2013). 
The overall welfare of each representative household is the sum of individual’s altruistic 
utility, written as:  
𝑊 = ∑ 𝑍𝑖 = 𝑍𝑚 + 𝑍𝑓. 
1.2.2 Optimal Taxation 
Following Apps and Rees (1999), I examine two income tax schemes: individual taxation and 
joint taxation. Under individual taxation, husband (𝑚) and wife (𝑓) have different tax rates. The 
government is to determine an optimal tax rate 𝜏𝑖
∗ for each individual (𝑖) to maximize tax revenue. 
The marginal tax rates are different for the husband and the wife (𝜏𝑚
∗ ≠ 𝜏𝑓
∗), 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑇 = ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖. 
Under joint taxation scheme, the government chooses the revenue-maximizing tax rate 𝜏∗ for 
each household unit, thus husband and wife are taxed at the same tax rate 𝜏∗. 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑇 = 𝜏 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖 
10 
Another important feature of this study is that I allow the tax rate to be endogenously related 
to individual’s labor supply. This assumption captures the progression of income tax schedule. 
Individual’s tax rate is determined either on the basis of personal income under individual taxation, 
or on the basis of household income under joint taxation. Even though the change in the tax 
schedule is exogenous to an individual’s initial behavior, it would affect the individual’s 
endogenous response by increasing or decreasing the labor supply to the new tax schedule. Thus, 
changes in the design of income taxation would affect individuals’ labor supply decision; 
meanwhile, changes in the labor supply would also influence the individual’s marginal tax rate. 
Past economic theory does not predict how individuals’ labor supply affects tax rate, because the 
marginal tax rate is exogenously given. 
 
1.3  Equilibrium 
1.3.1 Individual Taxation 
The household allocation decision is made in two stages. In the first stage, the government 
determines the revenue-maximizing tax rate for each household. The same amount of tax revenue 
will be re-distributed back to households so each household member is entitled to a share of it. The 
sharing rule for each spouse is also determined by the government and thus considered exogenous. 
In the second stage of the game, household members simultaneously make their independent 
consumption choices and allocate their time optimally between market work and home production, 
conditional on the given tax rates and received transfers. The household decision making is subject 
to the taxation system that individuals are facing. The family’s decision-making problem can be 
solved through backwards induction. 
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Applying the backward induction procedure, I begin with the second stage of the game and 
obtain the equilibrium corresponding to the husband and the wife. Under individual taxation, the 
utility maximization problem for spouse (𝑖) is given by,  
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The optimization problem for government is to maximize tax revenue function, while taking 
each family member’s labor supply as given, or written as, 
max
𝜏𝑚
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The optimal labor supply for husband and wife can be calculated by substituting the optimal 
tax rates back into their labor supply functions, or 
.
2
)1(
;
2
)1(



 



fI
f
mI
m
w
L
w
L  
12 
The equilibrium obtained are interior solutions. To examine the effects of intra-family transfer 
and altruistic preference on individuals’ time allocation decisions, I take the derivative of the labor 
supply and marginal tax rate with respect to sharing rules (𝜌) and degree of altruism (𝛿). (Proof 
see Appendix A) 
Proposition 3.1. Under individual taxation, intra-household transfer (ρ) does not affect the time 
allocation decision (
∂Li
∗
∂ρ
= 0) and the time spent on market production decreases with the degree 
of altruism (
∂Li
∗
∂δ
< 0)  for both husband and wife. 
Under individual taxation, the time allocation over market production and home production is 
dependent on shares of intra-household transfer shares. With a linear income tax scheme, the 
proportional income redistribution program exerts no impact on households. However, the degree 
of altruistic preferences toward other household members does affect the household’s time 
allocation decision. If spouses care more about each other, they will reduce their labor supply to 
market work and allocate more of their time to home production. 
Proposition 3.2. Under individual taxation, a larger share of transfer to the husband increases 
his l tax rate (
𝜕𝜏𝑚
∗
𝜕𝜌
> 0), and reduces the wife’s tax rate (
𝜕𝜏𝑓
∗
𝜕𝜌
< 0). Individual tax rate decreases 
when altruism increases for husband (
𝜕𝜏𝑚
∗
𝜕𝛿
< 0) if  2𝜃 > 𝛼 + 𝑤𝑚, the wife (
𝜕𝜏𝑓
∗
𝜕𝛿
< 0) if  2𝜃 >
𝛽 + 𝑤𝑓.  
Labor supply decision and marginal tax rates depends on the proportion of intra-family 
transfer and the degree of altruism for both spouses. For the husband, the marginal tax rate is 
positively related to the shares of transfer he received, since he has more incentives to supply more 
time to labor market. By contrast, the labor supply for the wife falls as the husband receives a 
larger share of transfer. This explains why the marginal tax rate for the wife falls as the shares of 
transfer to the husband increases. 
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1.3.2 Joint Taxation 
Under joint taxation, the optimization problem for spouse is described as, 
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The government solves its optimization problem given the optimal labor supply, 
max
𝜏𝐽
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𝐽 ) 
Under joint taxation, the equilibrium tax rate and labor supply for both spouses are written as, 
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Proposition 3.3. If the husband receives a larger share of intra-family transfer, his labor supply 
increases(
∂Lm
∗
∂ρ
> 0)only if the household’s income is sufficiently high, such that wf > θ(1 + δ) −
β. By contrast, higher transfer to husband will increase the labor supply of the wife  
∂Lf
∗
∂ρ
> 0 only 
if the household income is sufficiently low, such that wm < θ(1 + δ) − α.  . 
Proposition 3.3 implies that intra-family transfer program has an ambiguous effect on labor 
decisions for a two-earner household. When the family income is sufficiently high, an increase in 
the governmental transfer more to the husband will increase his labor supply and reduce the labor 
supply of the wife. When the family income is sufficiently low, an increase in the governmental 
transfer to the husband will increase the labor supply of the wife and reduce the husband’s labor 
supply. This is because the model assumes that individual’s labor supply decision, marginal tax 
rate and the share of intra-family transfer are mutually related. A higher share of transfer increases 
either the husband’s or the wife’s labor supply, and the marginal tax rate will increase for both 
spouses. Under joint taxation, the tax rates for spouses are jointly determined at household unit. 
For high income family, the benefit obtaining from a larger transfer to the husband exceeds the 
penalty associated with higher tax rates. The husband will increase his labor supply when he 
receives a greater amount of the transfer. At the same time, both transfer and tax-induced effects 
discourage the wife’s labor supply for the case of a high income family. For a low income family, 
the penalty of increasing tax rates dominates the benefit from a higher transfer, with the 
consequence that the husband will reduce his labor supply to market work. Surprisingly, the wife’s 
labor supply increases when more of the governmental transfer is given to the husband. 
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Proposition 3.4. Higher degree of altruism will increase the joint tax rate 
∂τ∗
∂δ
> 0. When the 
husband receives a higher share of transfer, the joint tax rate increases 
∂τ∗
∂ρ
> 0 on the condition 
that his relative wage is sufficiently high (
 wm
 wf
)
2
>
α
β
. 
Proposition 3.4. indicates the role of altruism on joint tax rates. Although the effect of the 
degree of altruism on the labor supply is shown to be ambiguous, the impact of altruism on tax 
rates is positive. Higher tax rates are associated with higher degrees of altruism. The influence of 
altruism on tax rates is dependent on the husband’s wage. When the husband’s wage is sufficiently 
high relatively to wife (
 wm
 wf
> √
𝛼
𝛽
 ), an increase in the amount of transfer to husband will increase 
the tax rate. 
1.3.3 Considering Two Types of Households 
So far, I do not make any assumption about how a household is formed. I will discuss two 
cases in which the formation of households is under different assumptions. In the first case, family 
is formed based on the assumption of assortative mating. Under this assumption, individuals 
choose their spouses with similar backgrounds such as age, education, earning ability, etc. Both 
spouses are equivalently productive in both market work and home production. In the second case, 
the formation of family is based on specialization, and each individual has comparative advantage 
in either market work or home production. In addition, I assume the husband is the primary earner 
and more productive in market work and receives a higher wage rate while the wife is more 
efficient with home production and bears lower marginal cost. 
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Type 1 Households of Equal Earners 
When spouses have similar earning abilities and other characteristics, they have the same 
wage rates and marginal costs of home production. That is, 𝑤𝑚 = 𝑤𝑓 = 𝑤 and 𝛼 = 𝛽 = ?̅?.  
Under individual taxation, the optimal labor supply to market work and home production are 
identical for the husband and the wife. And the labor supply in equilibrium for husband and wife 
is 𝐿𝑚
𝐼 = 𝐿𝑓
𝐼 =
?̅?+𝑤−𝜃(1+𝛿)
2?̅?
.  
The optimal marginal tax rates for husband and wife are 
𝜏𝑚
𝐼 =
?̅?+𝑤−𝜃(1+𝛿)
2𝑤(1−𝜌)(1−𝛿)
;  𝜏𝑓
𝐼 =
?̅?+𝑤−𝜃(1+𝛿)
2𝑤𝜌(1−𝛿)
. 
It comes as no surprise that when spouse have the same amount of earnings, their time 
allocation decisions are equivalent and they supply the same amount of time to market work and 
home production. However, their marginal tax rates are not identical. The ratio of their marginal 
tax rates is equal to that of the transfer shares or 
𝜏𝑚
𝐼
𝜏𝑓
𝐼 =
𝜌
1−𝜌
. 
Under joint taxation, the optimal labor supply for husband and wife are  
𝐿𝑚
𝐽 =
𝜌[?̅?+𝑤−𝜃(1+𝛿)]
?̅?
;  𝐿𝑓
𝐽 =
(1−𝜌)[?̅?+𝑤−𝜃(1+𝛿)]
?̅?
.  
And the optimal marginal tax rate is 𝜏𝑚
𝐽 =
?̅?+𝑤−𝜃(1+𝛿)
𝑤(1−𝛿)
.  
Unlike individual taxation, individual’s labor supply is not equivalent under joint taxation. 
The ratio of their labor supply is determined by the ratio of the transfer shares, or 
𝐿𝑚
𝐼
𝐿𝑓
𝐼 =
𝜌
1−𝜌
. 
Comparing the optimal labor supply and marginal tax rate across different taxation systems 
would provide a clear picture of how taxation affects the household member i ’s equilibrium 
outcomes: 
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(1) for ρ >
1
2
; 𝐿𝑚
𝐽 > 𝐿𝑚
𝐼 (𝐿𝑓
𝐼 ) > 𝐿𝑗
𝐽
; 𝜏𝑚
𝐼 > τ𝐽 > 𝜏𝑓
𝐼 ; 
(2) for ρ =
1
2
; 𝐿𝑚
𝐽 = 𝐿𝑚
𝐼 (𝐿𝑓
𝐼 ) = 𝐿𝑗
𝐽
; 𝜏𝑚
𝐼 = τ𝐽 = 𝜏𝑓
𝐼 , 𝑍𝐼 = 𝑍𝐽; 
(3) for ρ <
1
2
; 𝐿𝑓
𝐽 > 𝐿𝑚
𝐼 (𝐿𝑓
𝐼 ) > 𝐿𝑚
𝐽
; 𝜏𝑓
𝐼 > τ𝐽 > 𝜏𝑚
𝐼 . 
When the husband receives a larger share of transfer, as stated in the first condition, he will 
supply more to market work under joint taxation than he would have under individual taxation. 
It’s also interesting to see that his labor supply is higher than that of his spouse’s under joint 
taxation, even though they have the same earning ability and earn the same wage rate. The marginal 
tax rate under joint taxation is lower than the marginal tax rate for the husband and higher than the 
marginal tax rate for the wife, if spouses are taxed separately. 
When spouses equally share the income transfer, as stated in the second condition, their 
equilibrium choices are the same, regardless of taxation. Therefore they are indifferent to how they 
are taxed. Moving from individual to joint taxation or vice versa have no impact on a household’s 
time allocation decisions or well-beings. 
When the wife receives a large share of transfer, as stated in the last condition, she will supply 
more than her spouse under joint taxation, and the labor supply is higher than what she would have 
under individual taxation. This is the opposite situation for the first condition. The welfare 
comparison between the husband and the wife based on numerical calculation is discussed in 
Section 1.4. 
 
Type 2 Households of Income Disparate Earners 
When husband is the primary and wife is the secondary earner, 𝑤𝑚 > 𝑤𝑓 and the marginal 
cost of home production for husband is greater, α > β. Due to the complexity of the solution, I 
will discuss this case in more detail using numerical estimation in Section 1.4. 
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1.4  Numerical Evaluation 
In the framework discussed in Section 1.3, it is difficult to derive conclusions about the 
optimal taxation when the labor supply is endogenously determined by an individual’s earning 
ability. The effects of taxation on household behavior and the well-being of household members 
are also ambiguous. Thus, numerical estimation is needed to provide a better understanding. In the 
following, I use the framework derived in Section 1.3 with estimated household productivity 
parameters and family members’ altruistic preferences to simulate the optimal labor supply and 
welfare for a representative household under both individual and joint taxation. For the analysis, 
the spouses’ incomes are computed based on the methodology in Blau and Kahn (2007), and the 
values for household productivity estimates are based on Grahamm and Green (1984). The values 
used for calculation are provided in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1 Numerical Values for Evaluation 
  Equal Earners  Disparate Earners  
Log Wage Income (𝑤𝑖)   
 - Husband (𝑤𝑚)  3.15 3.15 
 - Wife (𝑤𝑓)  3.15 2.55 
Marginal Utility of Home Production (𝜃)  2.20 2.20 
Marginal Cost of Home Production (𝐶𝑖)   
 - Husband (α)  0.85 0.85 
 - Wife (β)  0.85 0.55 
Note: The subscript m indicates husband; f indicating wife. 
 
1.4.1 Household of Equal Earners 
The numerical estimation for spouses having similar earnings but different shares of transfer 
is provided in Table 1.2. When spouses split the income transfer equally, the optimal labor supply 
and utility of household members are identical under joint and individual taxation. Spouses are 
indifferent to individual or joint taxation and moving from individual to joint taxation or vice versa 
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would not improve the welfare for either spouse or the household as a whole. This scenario serves 
as the benchmark scenario for my analysis. 
Under individual taxation, for both spouses, the marginal tax rate increases with the received 
share of transfer. A larger share of transfer to the husband or the wife increases his or her incentive 
to supply market work. Meanwhile, he or she is taxed at a higher rate when the labor supply 
increases. The rising tax rate would lead to a reduction in his or her labor supply. These two 
opposing effects on spouse labor supply decision work at the same time. Based on my calculation, 
the optimal labor supply for both spouses are independent of the sharing rules. Moreover, the 
welfare of household members is not affected by the sharing rules, and both spouses are indifferent 
to income distribution rules. 
Table 1.2 Evaluating the Effect of Transfer Shares on Equal Earner Households 
 ρ = 0.4 ρ = 0.5 ρ = 0.6 
Individual Taxation    
Tax Rate tm = 0.450; tf  = 0.675 tm= 0.540; tf = 0.540 tm= 0.675; tf = 0.450 
Labor Supply Lm = 0.800; Lf = 0.800 Lm = 0.800; Lf = 0.800 Lm = 0.800; Lf = 0.800 
Individual Utility Zm = 4.060; Zf = 4.060 Zm= 4.060; Zf = 4.060 Zm = 4.060; Zf = 4.060 
Household Welfare 8.119 8.119 8.119 
Joint Taxation    
Tax Rate tm = tf = 0.540 tm = tf = 0.540 tm = tf = 0.540 
Labor Supply Lm  = 0.640; Lf  = 0.960 Lm  = 0.800; Lf  = 0.800 Lm  = 0.960; Lf  = 0.640 
Individual Utility Zm = 3.622; Zf = 4.472 Zm = 4.060; Zf = 4.060 Zm = 4.472; Zf = 3.622 
Household Welfare 8.093 8.119 8.093 
 
Under joint taxation, changing the rules of transfer does affect the labor supply decision of 
spouses. If the husband receives a higher share of transfer, his labor supply increases and is higher 
than that in the benchmark scenario; at the same time, the wife’s labor supply decreases and is 
lower than what she would have supplied in the benchmark case. Recall that in joint taxation, the 
marginal tax rate is determined by total income at the household level. Increases in the husband’s 
labor supply have positive effects on the tax rate while decreases in the wife’s labor supply have 
negative effects. Based on my calculation, the optimal marginal tax rates remain constant, 
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regardless of sharing rules. It’s worth mentioning that the welfare of a household is lower in any 
cases when spouses claim different shares of transfer. From the welfare perspective, the estimated 
value under individual taxation is greater than that under joint taxation when income transfer is 
not equally distributed among household members. 
Therefore, based on my calculation, the optimal taxation for households when spouses have 
similar earning ability is individual taxation. When both receive the same share of transfer, 
household members would be indifferent to taxation schemes and their optimal welfare is the same 
under individual and joint taxation. My results are consistent with that of Haan and Navarro (2008), 
who empirically estimated the optimal income taxation in a structural discrete choice labor supply 
model based on German Socio Economic Panel Study (SOEP). They find that the system of 
individual taxation is optimal when the government has a priority for redistribution towards 
couples in which both partners earn a similar amount of income. 
1.4.2 Household of Income Disparity Earners 
In what follows, I analyze the optimal labor supply and welfare for households in which 
spouses have different income. It’s important to understand the role of shares of intra-family 
transfer, ρ and the degree of altruism, δ in household decision making. I calculate the marginal tax 
rates, the labor supply, and net income, the level of individual’s well-being and the welfare of the 
household with different parameter values under both individual and joint taxation. Two 
restrictions are imposed. The lower bound is set under the assumption that the marginal tax rate 
for the wife is lower than that for the husband under individual taxation; the upper bound is set 
under the assumption that time endowment for both spouses allocated between market good and 
public good production is normalized to 1. The numerical results are presented through Table 1.3 
-Table 1.5. 
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Table 1.3 demonstrates the results of the impact of shares of intra-family transfer for 
individual and joint taxation, respectively. Intra-family transfer affects both the husband’s and the 
wife’s labor supply and tax rates differently, and the influences also vary by taxation. Under 
individual taxation, the shares of intra-family transfer and the tax rates for individuals move in the 
same direction. The tax rates of the husband and the wife are higher when they receive a larger 
share of transfer. It’s interesting to point out that under individual taxation; the labor supply for 
each individual is independent of the shares of transfer. The impact of shares of intra-family 
transfer on the labor supply could be through two channels. An increase in an individual’s share 
increases his or her labor supply, but meanwhile it also increases the individual’s marginal tax rate, 
which discourages his or her labor supply. These two opposing effects offset each other, with the 
results that individuals’ labor supply is unaffected by the shares of transfer. 
On the other hand, under joint taxation, there is very little change in tax rates when shares of 
transfer change. Even though the joint tax rates remain fairly constant, the labor supply for both 
spouses increases as they receive larger portions of transfer. This is because, based on the 
derivation, the variables for both spouses’ labor supply are mutually determined by the joint tax 
rates. If the husband receives greater shares of transfer, the wife receives less. The joint tax rate 
rises when the husband supplies more to labor market; meanwhile, it decreases when the wife 
supplies less. The two opposing forces occur at the same time and almost cancel each other out; 
as a consequence, there is very little change to the joint tax rates. For policy implication such as 
the design of optimal taxation, it is useful to compare individuals’ labor supply across different 
taxation. The husband’s labor supply under joint tax is higher than that under individual tax, while 
the labor supply of the wife is lower under joint taxation than under individual taxation. This is 
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evidence that the tax distortion effect is bigger under joint taxation, since higher tax burden is 
levied on the secondary income earner under the joint tax system. 
Table 1.3 Evaluating the Effects of Transfer Shares on Households with Disparate Earners 
 ρ = 0.21 ρ = 0.31 ρ = 0.41 
Individual Taxation    
Tax Rate tm = 0.327; tf  = 0.320 tm = 0.375; tf  = 0.217 tm = 0.438; tf  = 0.164 
Labor Supply Lm = 0.671; Lf  = 0.218 Lm = 0.671; Lf = 0.218 Lm = 0.671; Lf = 0.218 
Individual Utility Zm = 5.005; Zf  = 4.542 Zm = 5.005; Zf = 4.542 Zm = 5.005; Zf = 4.542 
Household Welfare 9.547 9.547 9.547 
Joint Taxation    
Tax Rate tm = tf  = 0.326 tm = tf  = 0.325 tm = tf  = 0.325 
Labor Supply Lm = 0.674; Lf = 0.214 Lm = 0.759; Lf = 0.109 Lm = 0.844; Lf  = 0.004 
Individual Utility Zm = 5.014; Zf = 4.536 Zm = 5.265; Zf = 4.363 Zm = 5.508; Zf = 4.182 
Household Welfare 9.551 9.629 9.691 
When the shares of transfer that each individual receives change, the impacts on their labor 
supply and tax rates vary by taxation. Because each individual claims a portion of the transfer and 
the portions of both should be add up to one, if the husband claims more, the wife will receive less 
and vice versa. For individual taxation, a higher share of transfer increases the tax rate an 
individual’s facing because he or she is disincentive to supply more to market work. Higher tax 
rates discourage their incentives such that the labor supply decreases. Therefore, the labor supply 
remains constant while individual tax rates increase under individual taxation. For joint taxation, 
higher shares for one individual directly increase his or her labor supply but decrease the supply 
of his or her spouse. Since the labor supply of both spouses jointly affects the tax rates, there will 
be little change in joint tax rates. 
Table 1.3 also shows the impact of shares of transfer on an individual and a household’s net 
income, which also differs by taxation. Under individual taxation, tax rates increase as an 
individual receives a higher share of transfer; meanwhile, the tax rate of his or her spouse 
decreases. Thus, if the share to the husband rises, the tax rate of the husband increases; with the 
constant labor supply, his net income decreases. By contrast, the tax rate of the wife decreases, 
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and her net income increases, provided that her labor supply remains unchanged. The decline in 
the husband’s net income exceeds the gain of the wife’s, so the total net income of the household 
decreases. Under joint taxation, on the contrary, the tax rates remain constant. The labor supply of 
the husband increases if he receives more shares, and so does the net income. But the labor supply 
of the wife decreases if her spouse (the husband) receives more, so her net income decreases, 
holding tax rates constant. Since the gain in the husband’s net income almost equals the loss of the 
wife’s, there is very little change in the family’s net income. 
The last two columns of Table 1.3 illustrate the impacts of transfer shares on an individual’s 
utility and the welfare of the household. The following analysis is given under the scenario that 
the husband receives a larger share of transfer. Under individual taxation, utility for both spouses 
as well as the household’s welfare are constant regardless of the shares of transfer. The explanation 
for this result could be the specification of utility function. Recall that altruistic instead of 
individual utility function is used in the model. Increasing the shares of transfer leads to an increase 
in the husband’s individual utility but decreases that of the wife’s. Since both spouses are assumed 
to care for each other and behave altruistically, the altruistic utility may be unaffected by the shares 
of transfer. Under joint taxation, utility for the husband increases while that for the wife decreases. 
The gain for the husband exceeds the loss for the wife; therefore, the aggregate welfare of the 
household increases as do the shares received by the husband. For policy implication, household 
welfare could increase under joint taxation if government compensates the primary earner with 
higher shares of intra-family transfer. Relative to individual taxation, joint taxation is optimal and 
improves the household welfare when spouses have inequality income, especially when the 
government subsidizes the secondary earner with higher transfer. 
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The numerical evaluation of the influence of altruism on tax rates, labor supply and net income 
are presented in Table 1.4. Based on the evaluation, both tax rates and labor supply decrease when 
household members are more altruistic, and this pattern is quite consistent for both individual and 
joint taxation. However, individuals respond in different ways in terms of their labor supply 
decisions. As the degree of altruism increases, the labor supply of the wife declines more than that 
of the husband. This could be the explanation for why the elasticity of the labor supply is higher 
for women. Moreover, the impact of altruism on the female labor supply varies based on taxation. 
The optimal labor supply level for the wife falls under joint taxation. The impact of the degree of 
altruism on individuals’ net income also differs based on taxation. 
Table 1.4 Estimating the Effect of Altruism on Households with Disparate Earners 
 δ = 0.19 δ = 0.25 δ = 0.33 
Individual Taxation    
Tax Rate tm = 0.392; tf = 0.376 tm = 0.383; tf = 0.295 tm = 0.369; tf  = 0.164 
Labor Supply Lm = 0.813; Lf = 0.438 Lm = 0.735; Lf = 0.318 Lm = 0.632; Lf  = 0.158 
Individual Utility Zm = 4.246; Zf  = 3.931 Zm = 4.656; Zf = 4.262 Zm = 5.216; Zf = 4.712 
Household Welfare 8.177 8.918 9.929 
Joint Taxation    
Tax Rate tm = tf = 0.387 tm = tf = 0.356 tm = tf = 0.305 
Labor Supply Lm = 0.823; Lf = 0.425 Lm = 0.788; Lf = 0.195 Lm = 0.741; Lf = 0.023 
Individual Utility Zm = 4.280; Zf  = 3.907 Zm = 4.820; Zf  = 4.148 Zm = 5.530; Zf  = 4.498 
Household Welfare 8.187 8.968 10.028 
Under individual taxation, the individual’s net income decreases when the degree of altruism 
increases and so does the household income. Under joint taxation, on the other hand, a higher 
degree of altruism increases the husband’s net income and lowers the net income of the wife; 
overall household income increases with altruism 𝛿. One possible explanation for the disparity in 
individual’s net income is the tax rates and labor supply are jointly determined in the model. The 
tax rates are lower as individuals supply less to the market work. However, joint taxation penalizes 
the secondary earner by imposing a higher tax rate. Thus, the labor supply for secondary earner is 
more elastic. On the contrary, joint taxation lowers the effective tax rate for the primary earner; as 
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a result, his labor supply is more inelastic. The numerical results suggest that distortion effect to 
labor supply is greater for females, especially when they are more altruistic towards their spouses. 
Table 1.4 also shows the numerical evaluation of altruism on individual utility and the welfare 
of the household. From the welfare perspective, both individuals’ utility and family welfare 
increase as the degree of altruism increases. Although Table 4 does not present the estimated value 
of tax dollars for both individuals and the household are also calculated. Based on the calculation, 
the tax dollars are lower when both spouses are more altruistic. The numerical results suggest that 
the amount of tax dollars may be the major contributor to determine the utility of individuals as 
well as household welfare. The influence of tax dollars on welfare is more prominent when 
individuals are more altruistic. Household welfare increases with household members’ altruistic 
preferences. Compared to individual taxation, joint taxation is also optimal and improves the 
welfare of spouse with unequal earnings. The more altruistic the household members, the more 
welfare gains from joint taxation. 
Comparing with the numerical results of two cases discussed above, the choices of optimal 
taxation for household members are dependent on their earning abilities, wage structure of 
household, and the proficiencies with household production and their preferences towards other 
household members. When designing the income taxation for spouses, the government should take 
these factors into consideration. 
 
1.5  Extension 
1.5.1 Model without Transfer Program 
In this section, I present a comparable model without intra-family transfer of any form in order 
to gain a better understanding of how taxation structure affects the time allocation decisions of 
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household members. In the model with no transfer or when 𝜌𝑚 = 𝜌𝑓 = 0. The derivation results 
and proofs can be found in Appendix A. 
Proposition 5. Under individual taxation, both husband’s and wife’s labor supply and tax rate 
decrease as he or she is more altruistic towards the spouse, when no transfer is available. That is, 
∂Li
∂δ
< 0 and 
∂τi
∂δ
< 0 for i = m, f.  
Proposition 5 implies that, in the absence of intra-family transfer, both spouse supply less to 
market work as he or she is more altruistic, given they are taxed individually. Therefore, the tax 
rate for each individual is lower. 
Proposition 6. Under joint taxation, the wife supplies less of her time to market work (
∂Li
∂δ
< 0) 
when the degree of altruism increases, but the effect on the husband’s labor supply is 
indeterminate with respect to the degree of altruism. The marginal tax rate decreases if spouses 
are more altruistic to each other (
∂τ
∂δ
< 0). 
Under joint taxation, the influence of altruism on the husband’s labor market supply is 
ambiguous but the wife will decrease their labor supply as she is more altruistic. 
1.5.2 Numerical Comparison between Transfer and Non-transfer Model 
Table 1.5 presents the numerical results of the baseline model with intra-family transfer and 
the model without such a program. For both models, joint taxation lowers the tax rate for the 
husband (primary earner) but raises the tax rate for the wife (secondary earner). These results are 
consistent with the study of Crossley and Jeon (2006). 
For both models, under joint taxation, the husband supplies more of his time to the market 
work and the wife supplies less of her time than they would under individual taxation. These results 
can be used to explain the differences between men’s labor supply in the United States (joint 
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taxation) and that in the majority of OECD countries (individual taxation). A recent study by Bick 
and Fuchs-Schundeln (2014) shows that married men aged 25 and 54 in the United States work 
the longest, 1970.4 hours per year. Their studies also indicate that married men work between 9 to 
17 percent fewer hours in Europe than they do in the US. The joint taxation distorts the labor 
supply in two ways, by reducing the wife’s supply to the market work while increasing the supply 
of the husband’s. However, joint taxation improves the household’s welfare. One possible 
explanation is that the tax dollars paid by each household are lower when couples are taxed jointly. 
Another possibility lies in the value assigned for altruism, or how much family members care about 
each other. When family members are more self-centered, they will enjoy higher utility by 
supplying insufficient time to home production. For a given value set for the degree of altruism in 
the analysis, household welfare under joint taxation is higher than which under individual taxation 
for both models with and without transfer.  
Table 1.5 Estimation of With (Without) Transfer 
 With Transfer Without Transfer 
Individual Taxation   
Tax Rate tm = 0.413; tf  = 0.228 tm = 0.146; tf  = 0.056 
Labor Supply Lm = 0.541; Lf = 0.291 Lm = 0.541; Lf = 0.291 
Individual Utility Zm = 5.286; Zf = 5.136 Zm = 5.221; Zf = 4.788 
Household Welfare 10.423 10.009 
Joint Taxation   
Tax Rate tm = tf  = 0.326 tm = tf  = 0.325 
Labor Supply Lm = 0.654; Lf = 0.166 Lm = 0.727; Lf = 0.085 
Individual Utility Zm = 5.557; Zf = 4.919 Zm = 5.693; Zf = 4.463 
Household Welfare 10.476 10.156 
Even though the welfare gain is smaller in the model with transfer, the estimated welfare in 
the model with transfer are higher than those in the model with no transfer, under both individual 
and joint taxation. However, the net welfare gain under joint and individual taxation is not evenly 
distributed across household members. Compared to the results under individual taxation, the 
welfare gain to the husband at the expense of the welfare loss of the wife. Since tax rates are 
28 
endogenously determined in the model, they are mutually dependent on each individual’s 
parameter factors and wage rates. Under individual taxation, both spouses enjoy higher altruistic 
utility, but the welfare gain is higher for the husband. 
Under both taxation schemes, the tax rates are inversely related to marginal productivity of 
home production. As mentioned before, the tax rates and labor supply are jointly determined in 
the model. This interactive relation reflects the characteristics of progressive tax. As individuals 
become more productive in home production, it will take them less time to prepare a home-cooked 
meal, to iron the clothes, to mow the lawn, etc. They could supply the “extra” time to market work, 
which in turn increases their tax rates and aggregate household tax dollars. The degree of altruism 
has a similar influence on the utility of each individual through tax rates. If household couples are 
less altruistic towards each other, they will supply less to home production and more to market 
work. As a result, tax rates as well as tax dollars increase; by contrast, their utilities will decrease. 
In conclusion, given the results from numerical estimation, the baseline model challenges the 
conventional Ramsey consideration and suggests that moving from individual to joint taxation 
could possibly improve household welfare. 
The numerical estimation regarding the intra-family transfer program is presented in the third 
column. To shed light on the influence of an intra-family policy on household labor division, I 
assume that the values of transfer shares are exogenously taken. For future studies, one could relax 
this assumption and let the value be chosen by couples according to their bargaining power. One 
of the prominent features when imposing the transfer program is that the tax rates under both 
individual and joint taxation increase. Based on the previous calculation, tax rates are also 
determined by the shares of transfer. If each individual is entitled to a higher share of transfer, it 
would encourage him or her to supply more to the market work and contribute more to the 
29 
aggregate transfer. Therefore, the tax rates will increase. Interestingly, even though the tax rates 
increase, the labor supply for each spouse remains unchanged under individual taxation. The 
possible interpretation is that intra-family transfer influences the labor supply decision through 
two opposite effects. A higher share of transfer increases the spouse’s labor supply. However, the 
tax rate of the recipient increases as a result when he or she supplies more time to the market work. 
A higher tax rate depresses the spouse’s labor supply choice. Intra-family transfer program has 
two opposite effects on spouse’s labor supply that roughly cancel out. 
Compared to the numerical results estimated by model with transfer, the husband supplies less 
while the wife supplies more to the market work. It’s helpful to reduce the distortion effect to labor 
supply if intra-family transfer is enacted under the joint taxation. Furthermore, the numerical 
estimation in the last column indicates that the household welfare under joint taxation dominates 
which of individual taxation. Additionally, the results also show that a larger welfare gain is 
achieved through intra-family transfer, moving from individual to joint taxation. 
 
1.6  Conclusion 
Not only does the taxation system but also the redistribution of income across household 
members affect spouse’s time allocation decisions and welfare outcomes. That is because both 
intra-family altruistic preference between household members and the interaction between their 
labor supply and marginal tax rates need to be considered in modeling the household decision. 
Household members endogenously choose their labor supply and marginal tax rates to maximize 
their welfare preferences. Factors affecting individuals’ labor supply would also influence the 
choice of marginal tax rate. And those choices are also affected by individual’s altruistic preference 
towards other household members. Motivated by this finding, I have explored the welfare 
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implications of tax-transfer schedule using a non-cooperative approach to household behavior. The 
following conclusions are obtained. First, the degree of altruism affects household members’ labor 
supply and optimal tax rate. The well-beings of both spouses are greater when they are more 
altruistic. These conclusions are consistent across different taxation systems, while the wife’s labor 
supply is relatively more sensitive under joint taxation. Many studies have been done on estimating 
the labor supply elasticity of married couples across countries (Blau and Kahn 2007; Bargain et 
al. 2014). My model provides a rigorous theoretical foundation for such empirical work. 
I also show that each spouse’s labor supply decision is independent of the intra-family transfer 
under individual taxation. A larger share of intra-family transfer increases the recipient’s incentive 
to supply more to the labor market but also increase the recipient’s marginal tax rate, which 
discourages his or her labor supply. The two conflicting forces offset each other. By contrast, under 
joint taxation, changes in the sharing rules of intra-family transfers significantly affect both 
spouse’s labor supply while leaving the marginal tax rates fairly stable. That is because the tax 
liability is determined on the basis of total family income under joint taxation, and the marginal 
tax rate is related to total household labor supply. Changes in the sharing rules of intra-family 
transfer increase the labor supply of one spouse while the labor supply of the other. As a 
consequence, the total family labor supply does not change much relative to the individual labor 
supply. The results also show that if the government targeting increase the female labor supply, 
especially for low income family, the effective way is to subsidize the wife with larger shares of 
income transfer. The model developed in this paper provides a theoretical explanation for the 
exercise of Earned Income Tax Credit. 
The paper has a few limitations. First, it does not examine the optimal design of income 
taxation in the context of a non-cooperative household (Meier and Rainer 2012). This paper can 
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be thought of as complementary to theirs in that it can explain why particular variables, such as 
the altruistic preference, influence intra-household allocations. Second, I do not consider dynamic 
aspects of household decision making, such as investment in children (Ott 1995) or education 
(Konrad and Lommerud 2000). While a valuable project, it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Third, I do not discuss the “threat point”. It’s well understood that the “threat point” provides a 
lower limit on the well-being each spouse can achieve in marriage (Rubinstein 1982). However, 
formally including it as such is beyond the scope of this analysis. A number of avenues for future 
research exist. A particularly interesting issue is to focus on the dynamics of marriage 
relationships. When spouses interact repeatedly, it is possible to design relational or self-enforcing 
contracts so that any short-term incentive to behave non-cooperatively is offset by a long-term 
benefit from adhering to efficient patterns of behavior (Thomas and Worrall 2010). It would be 
interesting to study how alternative tax regimes affect the properties of such relational contracts. 
Future theoretical research in the area of family taxation might also explore other dynamic aspects 
of household behavior, such as the effects of different tax regimes on human capital investments 
or on marriage formation and dissolution. 
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Gender Wage Inequality during the Privatization 
Reform in Urban China 
2.1 Introduction 
Given the long history of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the enormous social 
responsibilities imposed, reforming SOEs has been an important component of China’s 
transformation into a socialist market economy. This paper examines the effects of SOEs reform 
on labor market outcomes, focusing on the gender wage differentials. 
Due to economic disturbance and political turmoil in late 1980s, China’s economic growth 
fell sharply and GDP growth was only 4.0% in 1988 and 2.8% in 1989 (Chow and Perkins 2014). 
In order to prevent any economic or political crises, the 14th National Congress of Communist 
Party of China (CPC) in 1992 proclaimed that the ultimate objective of economic reform was 
“socialist market economy”, and confirmed the necessity of establishing modern corporate system. 
Therefore, the year of 1992 was a major turning point in the history of Chinese development 
(Garnaut and Song 2006). As competition emerged in the Chinese economy and prices 
increasingly became market determined, many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) performance 
deteriorated quickly and the share of state-owned economy declined. According to the State Assets 
Management Administration, total losses by SOEs increased from 2.6 billion yuan in 1984 to 18.6 
billion in 1992 and to 47.4 billion in 1995. Between 1978 and 1993, the state share of industrial 
output decreased from 78% to 43% and the share of SOE employment fell from 75% to 60% in 
the urban area (China Statistical Yearbook 1994). By the end of 1994, China had about 300,000 
SOEs with about 75 million state employees. Although these SOEs consumed a great portion of 
bank credit and other resources, close to half of them were loss makers. In September 1995, the 
Fifth Plenary Session of the 14th CPC Central Committee required restructuring the ownership 
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structure of state-owned enterprises. By the end of 1995, there were 100 large and medium 
industrialized SOEs selected by the State Council, to participate the program of “corporatization 
experiment”. This program has initiated China’s SOE reform.  
Guided by the principle of “grasp the large, release the small”, the central government 
maintained control over the largest 300 SOEs in strategic industries, and granted local 
governments the authority to lease or sell smaller SOEs.  The purpose of the SOEs reform was to 
improve production efficiency and decentralization of management decisions. According to Cao, 
et al. (1999), SOEs reform has proceeded in three areas: privatization of smaller SOEs, massive 
layoff in the SOEs, and restructuring of large SOEs. By the end of 2001, about 86% of SOEs were 
restructured and about three quarters of the restructured enterprises were either fully or partially 
privatized. At the same time, China’s non-state owned sector has been steadily growing.  Between 
1992 and 2001, the proportion of total industrial output by the non-state owned industry in that of 
the national total increased from 48.5% to 78%, at an average growth rate of 5.5%; the proportion 
of the non-state owned sector in the urban employment rose from 39.0% to 68.1%, an average 
annual increase of 6.4%. 6  The emergence of enterprises with different types of ownership 
structures was a major feature of China’s SOE reform.  
State policy efforts to establish a market-oriented economy and to implement SOEs reform 
have had a profound influence on the structures of labor market. First, SOEs reform was intended 
to promote market efficiency and correct the misallocation of labor between the state and the non-
state sectors. Before the reform, soft budget constraints and the government’s full employment 
goals had led to substantial redundant labor in SOEs. In 1995, the Ministry of Labor issued new 
                                                 
6 See Development of the Non-state Owned Sector. China.org.cn (2003).  [online]Available at: 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2003chinamarket/79519.htm 
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rules allowing listed SOEs to set their own wages as long as wage growth exceeded profit growth 
but did not exceed labor productivity growth, and encouraged enterprises to consider skills and 
productivity in addition to occupation and rank in determining wages. These new rules affected 
about 40% of SOEs. Tens of millions of workers in the state sector have been laid off (Yueh 2004).  
In addition to increased unemployment, there was a sharp reduction in the labor force participation 
rate, especially among older workers. As reported by World Bank (2013), the share of employment 
by SOEs has declined from 60.5% in 1998 to 19.4percent in 2010. The labor mobility across 
sectors, especially from the low productivity to the high productivity sectors became a major 
source of economic growth in China. Second, SOE reform increased the incentives and autonomy 
of managers of SOEs. Under the model of separating ownership from operation, SOEs were 
granted a certain level of autonomy in decision making, including some authority and power on 
decisions about marketing, technical innovation, and most importantly, recruitment and selection, 
dismissal, promotion, rewards, and even the arrangement of vocational training programs (Warner, 
Goodall, and Ding 1999). Third, the radical SOE reform widens the income disparities across 
different provinces and regions, especially the gap between coastal areas and interior areas. Faster 
economic growth in coastal regions was evidenced by the remarkable growth of private ﬁrms and 
their increasing share in total industrial output in those regions. Enormous literature has 
investigated the causes and the impact of regional disparities in economic growth in China. 
Maurer-Fazio and Hughes (2002) conﬁrmed that regional disparity is strongly associated with the 
implementation of economic reforms in China. One of the consequences of regional disparities 
was the migration from the less developed interior regions to the more developed coastal regions. 
There were regional disparities in labor market development during economic reforms.  
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Privatizing the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a major step in transforming centralized 
economies into market economies. By the end of 2005, over two-thirds of SOEs with 11.4 trillion 
RMB (1.4 trillion USD) worth of state assets were privatized.  Unlike the Russia or Central and 
Eastern Europe, China adopted multiple approaches to privatize its SOEs. These approaches 
include both complete privatization with changes in ownership, such as management buy-outs 
(MBO) and sales to outsiders, and partial privatization without ownership changes, such as share 
issue privatization, joint ventures with foreign firms, and leasing (Zhang 2006). Consequently, a 
large number of foreign-invested enterprises, private enterprises, urban collective enterprises, and 
mixed ownership state-owned enterprises were born.  
While the labor market outcomes of privatization of the SOEs reform have been greatly 
studied, few studies on this topic provide a clear picture. There is also little know about the impact 
of cross-regional heterogeneity of privatization process on the gender outcomes. This study fills 
the gap in literature and examines the relationship between progress of privatization and gender 
wage inequality in urban China. Moreover, we investigate the changes in gender earnings 
diﬀ erentials and gender discrimination during the process of economic transition from 1995 to 
2007. Instead of analyzing the progress of economic reforms on diﬀ erent geographic locations, 
we measure regional variation of progress in economic transition by the extent of privatization. 
The scope of privatization can be evaluated by the performance of non-state owned enterprises by 
provincial-level indicator: non-state share of employment. Thus we are able to identify the eﬀ ect 
of the change in employment shares for non-state sector through decomposition method on urban 
wage inequality between men and women.  
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides some background 
on gender inequality of earnings in urban China. Section 2.3 describes the data and the 
methodology. Results are reported in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.2 Gender Earnings Inequality in Urban China  
Increasing attention has been given to the impact of economic transition on gender wage 
diﬀerentials as the Chinese economic reforms have progressed. Previous studies showed that the 
gender earnings gap increased since late 1980s in the Chinese urban labor market (Kanbur and 
Zhang 2005; Meng 2012; Zhang and Junsen 2003). Diﬀerent arguments exist for explaining the 
rising gender gap of earnings. According to one perspective, returns to human capital increased 
and the diﬀerences in educational attainments and work skills between female and male workers 
were reﬂected more in earnings diﬀerentials. Khan et al. (1999) found rapid increases in returns to 
education in post-reform China. If education attainment and work skills of female workers are 
signiﬁcantly lower than those of males, higher earnings will be compensated to males while lower 
earnings as a penalty would be given to females. Based on the national census data (2000), women 
received 0.93 fewer years of schooling than men in urban China; and more than half wage gap was 
attributable to the gender diﬀerences in education and other human capital characteristics between 
1988 and 1995 (Gustafsson and Li 2000). Alternative perspective claimed that the segregation of 
women in female-concentrated, low-paying occupations is the most direct source of the gender 
gap in earnings (Marini and Fan 1997). The pre-reform labor market in urban China was 
characterized by a segmented labor market between the advantageous state sector and the 
disadvantageous non-state sector; and men were concentrated in the former and women in the 
latter (Bian 1994). Under the socialist planned economy, SOEs were the dominating form of 
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production units. Workers were assigned to jobs by administrative measures and wages were 
centrally regulated in wage-scales. Economic reform in China has not completely reversed this 
order. Furthermore, the reform of pay rule for civil servants of 1993 allowed diﬀerent regions to 
set up their own extra-pay scheme, which related the pay increase of regional civil servants to their 
local economic growth. In other words, the reform authorized local governments set wages for 
civil servants according to public budget. Since then, the gap between civil servants earnings has 
increased across provinces and varies by different government agencies of the same region. 
Besides, the pay for civil servants was collective-owned enterprises (COEs) and private ﬁrms (Dai 
et al. 2005). The state-owned sector was privileged over the collectively owned and private sectors, 
with better rewards for employees (Naughton 1997). Throughout the decade of our study, women 
are consistently concentrated in the non-state sector of the economy, where the average incomes 
were 20% to 30% below the overall average. In contrast, the sector with the highest average income 
was “joint-venture”, in which average incomes were 40% to 80% higher than the overall average 
and in which women held a declining share of positions over the 1990s. Another important reason 
that why women generally earn less than men in the literature was explained by the fact that 
interruption of their working career for child births. However, such interruptions have generally 
been rather short among mothers in urban China. After leaving school almost all women entered 
the labor force and their number of working hours have been remarkably similar to men 
(Gustafsson and Li 2000). In addition, majority of population in urban China was subject to strict 
“one child policy” until recently; thus one would expect only one such career interruption for about 
half of the mothers. The interruption in career due to childbearing in China is quite diﬀerent from 
which in many other countries.  
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One consequence of SOEs reform was that local authorities and enterprises had greater 
autonomy in hiring and compensation decisions. The decentralization of wage setting provided 
more room for discrimination. The urban income inequality has increased signiﬁcantly since mid-
1990s (Khan and Riskin 2005; Xia et al. 2009). The Gini coeﬃcient of earnings in urban China 
increased by 45.5% from 1988 to 2007 (Shen and Deng 2008). The enactment of the nationwide 
Labor Law in 1995 notably gave employers increasing discretion and ﬂexibility in their labor 
market decisions. Given the abundant labor force and the patriarchal social norms, the loosening 
of the Chinese government’s iron grip on the economy may also encouraged a resurgence of 
workplace gender discrimination (Maurer-Fazio and Hughes 2002; Ng 2007; Knight et al.2009). 
On the other hand, massive economic reforms intensiﬁed market competition and thus may reduce 
gender discrimination in the labor market (Naughton 1996). These two obviously opposite eﬀects 
of economic reform on gender wage inequality are echoed by conﬂicting empirical evidence. Some 
researcher’s documented a declining trend in gender wage disparity in the post-reform Chinese 
economy. Liu, et al. (2000) showed that gender-based discrimination in the overall gender wage 
diﬀerential declines substantially in ﬁrms across diﬀerent ownerships. Even though, Gustafsson & 
Li (2000) found no signiﬁcant eﬀect of economic reform on gender wage discrimination in China 
from 1988 to 1995. Li & Song (2013) reported larger gender wage disparity in urban China from 
1995 to 2007. Recent study carried out by Braunstein and Brenner (2007), which investigated the 
eﬀect of FDI on male and female wages in urban China. They showed that women experienced 
larger gains from FDI than men in 1995, but that the gender-based wage advantage reversed by 
2002. Based on a ﬁrm-level data set, Zhang and Dong (2008) found no evidence of gender wage 
discrimination for either export oriented or non-export oriented ﬁrms. Chen et al. (2013) examined 
the inter-ﬁrm variations in gender inequality. One of their main ﬁndings was that there is no 
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signiﬁcant sign of gender discrimination for foreign and exporting ﬁrms, even though the gender 
gap is larger in those ﬁrms. Meanwhile, sizable income disparity across the diﬀerent types of 
ownership further stirs the debate. Maurer-Fazio and Hughes (2002) showed a smaller gender 
wage gap among collective-owned enterprises (COEs). Zhang and Dong (2008) showed that 
unskilled female workers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) received higher wage premiums than 
those in other types of ﬁrms. Cai and Wang, (2008) investigated the inter-and intra-sector gender 
gaps in urban labor market and found that most of the gender earning diﬀerentials coming from 
within-sector and that only 14% of the within-sector earning diﬀerentials can be explained by 
diﬀerences in human capital and other characteristics between men and women. They pointed out 
women are more likely to be discriminated against in the labor market, partly because of their 
earlier retirement age. 
Given that our data consist of cross-sectional surveys taken in 1995, 2002, and 2007, it is 
useful to consider the major changes that took place in the sub-periods between the surveys. The 
surveys were timed to give fairly equal intervals between them and to some extent align with 
notable changes in the Chinese economy and, to some extent, political leadership. The ﬁrst sub-
period, 1995-2002, can be characterized as a period of retrenchment within the urban state sector, 
as it coincided with the period of radical urban reforms known as “Xiagang” under the premiership 
of Zhu Rongji (1998-2003).  Falling proﬁtability in the state-owned sector led to a mass 
retrenchment program, breaking the “iron bowl” (job security) in the state sector and creating space 
for the emergence of a private sector. By the end of 2003, the number of lay-oﬀ workers reached 
28.18 million (News Office of State Council 2004). In other words, roughly one fourth of SOE 
workers were laid oﬀ. Not all workers were equally at risk of lay-oﬀ. For example, older workers 
and women were signiﬁcantly more likely to be laid oﬀ than others (Appleton et al. 2002). The 
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threat of redundancy was one factor inﬂuencing wages under a rent-sharing model. At the same 
time, some urban workers also started to face more competition from rural-urban migrants. Starting 
in 1992, controls on rural-urban migration were gradually relaxed, with the result that the number 
of rural urban migrants rose from an estimated 15 million in 1990 to 145 million in 2009 (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China 2011), accounting for roughly a third of urban employment. Appleton 
et al. (2004) showed that migrants were less educated and were more likely to compete with low 
skilled urban workers. The second sub-period, 2002-2007, can be characterized as fast growing 
privatization. A signiﬁcant private sector has already started to emerge, as urban workers 
responded to lay-oﬀ of the late 1990s by turning to the non-state sector. As a consequence, the 
share of employment in state-owned enterprises started to fall, a trend that accelerated after 2000 
by the restructuring of ﬁrm ownership. Based on the data of the Chinese Household Income 
Project, about 84.5% of workers were employed in state-owned enterprises (SOE) in 1995. The 
share of SOE workers fell to 66.1% in 2002 and further to 37.4% in 2007. This period was also 
characterized by increased openness, coming just after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. 
Growth accelerated (from 8 to 10%) but the leadership of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen 
Jia Bao (2003-13) sought to moderate the pursuit of growth with a concern for equity, under the 
slogan of “socialist harmonious society”. This included a more tolerant attitude to rural-urban 
migrants, a concern for balanced development across the regions and the enforcement of minimum 
wages in cities. 
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2.3 Data and Methodology  
2.3.1 Methodology  
To address earning diﬀerentials between males and females by region, estimating an earning 
function by gender and region is the ﬁrst step. The following log earning functions for men (𝑊𝑚,𝑡) 
and women (𝑊𝑓,𝑡) are estimated:  
 ln𝑊𝑚,𝑡 = 𝑋𝑚,𝑡𝛽𝑚,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑚,𝑡;   (1) 
   ln 𝑊𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑋𝑓,𝑡𝛽𝑓,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑓,𝑡.   (2) 
Where 𝑋𝑚,𝑡 and 𝑋𝑓,𝑡 represent various earning determinants including personal characteristics 
(education, marital status, work experience), job related information (occupation, industry sector, 
ownership type, and nature of job positions); 𝛽𝑚,𝑡  and 𝛽𝑓,𝑡 are corresponding estimated 
coeﬃcients; 𝜀𝑚,𝑡 and 𝜀𝑓,𝑡 are random error terms. The subscripts m and f refer to the male and 
female groups in year t. Earnings functions in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) are estimated by 1995, 2002 and 
2007 Chinese Household Income Project, respectively. And the gender wage gap in a particular 
year (t) can be analyzed by the well-known procedure developed by Oaxaca (1973), which is 
specified as:  
ln ?̅?𝑚,𝑡 − ln ?̅?𝑓,𝑡 = ?̅?𝑚,𝑡𝛽𝑚,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑓,𝑡𝛽𝑓,𝑡.   (3) 
Where ln ?̅?𝑚,𝑡  and ln ?̅?𝑓,𝑡  are the average logarithm of male and female earnings, 
respectively; ?̅?𝑚,𝑡 and ?̅?𝑓,𝑡 are the vectors of average earnings-determining characteristics of the 
male and female samples, respectively.  
To disentangle the contributions of various factors to the gender gap, we adopt the 
decomposition method proposed by Neumark (1988). The main advantage of this decomposition 
method over the traditional Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is that the former can identify the 
contribution of earnings inequality to the gender earning gap. The Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) 
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decomposition approach, also known as bi-fold decomposition, which has been operated based on 
reduced form regression and breaks down the raw diﬀerential between men and women into its 
components parts. Given that the logarithm of monthly wage income for males and female 
represented by ln ?̅?𝑚,𝑡  and ln ?̅?𝑓,𝑡; the gender diﬀerence in logarithm wage income, ln ?̅?𝑚,𝑡 −
ln ?̅?𝑓,𝑡 can be decomposed into two components:  
ln ?̅?𝑚,𝑡 − ln ?̅?𝑓,𝑡 =  (?̅?𝑚,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑓,𝑡)𝛽𝑚,𝑡 + ?̅?𝑓,𝑡(𝛽𝑚,𝑡 − 𝛽𝑓,𝑡).   (4) 
The ﬁrst component of Eq. (4) is gender diﬀerences attributable to observable productivity-
related characteristics. It is usually interpreted as explained or endowment eﬀects. The second 
component in Eq. (4) is the earning gap due to diﬀerences in the male and female returns to these 
productivity related characteristics -it is commonly regarded as unexplained or discrimination 
eﬀects. Because the diﬀerences in male and female productive characteristics are valued according 
to the male returns in Eq. (4), it presumably considers the male earnings structure as the earnings 
structure prevails in the absence of discrimination. It can also be argued that if the female earning 
structure prevails in the absence of discrimination, and Eq. (4) can be rewritten as 
ln ?̅?𝑚,𝑡 − ln ?̅?𝑓,𝑡 =  (?̅?𝑚,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑓,𝑡)𝛽𝑓,𝑡 + ?̅?𝑚,𝑡(𝛽𝑚,𝑡 − 𝛽𝑓,𝑡).   (5) 
Even though functionally equivalent, the overall pattern using the male wage structure as the 
non-discriminatory wage structure is closer to the results adopting the pooled male and female 
wage structure (Neumark 1988). However, these two decompositions generally yield diﬀerent 
estimates for the earnings diﬀerential components, also named as index number problem (Brown, 
Moon, and Zoloth 1980). The decomposition used in our study follows Oaxaca & Ransom (1994), 
which assume that nondiscriminatory wage structure can be represented by a weighted regression 
based on a pooled regression. This decomposition is based on three components  
ln ?̅?𝑚,𝑡 − ln ?̅?𝑓,𝑡 =  (?̅?𝑚,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑓,𝑡)𝛽𝑡
∗ + [?̅?𝑚,𝑡(𝛽𝑚,𝑡 − 𝛽𝑡
∗) + ?̅?𝑓,𝑡(𝛽𝑡
∗ − 𝛽𝑓,𝑡)].   (6) 
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Where 𝛽𝑡
∗is the vector of estimated coeﬃcients for pooled sample of male and female indi-
viduals at year t. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of Eq. (6) is the diﬀerence in the male and 
female average productivity characteristics evaluated as the market in the absence of 
discrimination; and the other two terms in the bracket contribute to the treatment (unexplained) 
component. The ﬁrst term in the bracket ?̅?𝑚,𝑡(𝛽𝑚,𝑡 − 𝛽𝑡
∗) measures treatment advantage on male 
workers if 𝛽𝑚,𝑡 > 𝛽𝑡
∗; the second term in the bracket ?̅?𝑓,𝑡(𝛽𝑡
∗ − 𝛽𝑓,𝑡) measures female’s treatment 
disadvantage if 𝛽𝑡
∗ > 𝛽𝑓,𝑡. These two terms represent the amount of which male are overvalued 
and of which female are undervalued in terms of labor market returns to productivity factors. The 
limitation of this method is that it is not able to capture the variation of wage distribution across 
males and females over time and across regions on the gender income gap. It is more likely that 
workers with low levels of education, lack of skills, and employed in the non-public ownership 
sectors face larger extent of discrimination. Even for workers with similar education levels and 
skills in the same ownership sector, the extent of discrimination across diﬀerent regions may not 
be the same. To correct for the possible bias, we further decompose the gender wage diﬀerentials 
for diﬀerent economic region across time.  
To analyze the changes in gender wage diﬀerentials across time by region, we adopt the 
technique proposed by (Wellington 1993). In the spirit of the Oaxaca one period decomposition, 
the change in the wage gap between time periods 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 𝑎 for a particular region is decomposed 
by the following equation:  
(ln ?̅?𝑚,𝑡+𝑎 − ln ?̅?𝑓,𝑡+𝑎) − (ln ?̅?𝑚,𝑡 − ln ?̅?𝑓,𝑡)
= [𝛽𝑚,𝑡+𝑎(?̅?𝑚,𝑡+𝑎 − ?̅?𝑚,𝑡) − 𝛽𝑓,𝑡+𝑎(?̅?𝑓,𝑡+𝑎 − ?̅?𝑓,𝑡)]
+ [?̅?𝑚,𝑡(𝛽𝑚,𝑡+𝑎 − 𝛽𝑚,𝑡) − ?̅?𝑓,𝑡(𝛽𝑓,𝑡+𝑎 − 𝛽𝑓,𝑡)];   (7) 
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The ﬁrst term of the decomposition on the right-hand side represents the change in the wage 
gap due to changes in the means evaluated at their own 𝑡 + 𝑎 coeﬃcients. It answers the following 
question, “what portion of the wage gap can be accounted for by changes in the means, when the 
returns to the independent variables were constant at their 𝑡 + 𝑎  levels”. The second term 
represents the portion of the wage gap can be explained by changes in the returns to the 
characteristics. Even though alternative methods (Blau and Beller 1988; Smith and Welch 1989) 
are available to gauge the change in the wage gap over time, Wellington (1993) points out neither 
speciﬁcation is clearly better than the other. In addition, given the diﬃculties in interpreting the 
interaction terms, we choose to use Wellington (1993) method.  
Considering changes in wages over time, one may argue that changes in the wage distribution 
could be a concern. Juhn et al. (1991) introduced an innovative method of decomposing residual 
wage diﬀerentials among groups of workers. Their decomposition method was based on percentile 
rankings. The residual diﬀerentials between groups were decomposed into changes in the 
diﬀerence in their mean percentile ranks (changes in the level of unmeasured skill) and changes in 
the dispersion of the residual wage distribution (changes in the returns to unmeasured skill). 
Unfortunately, this decomposition method proved to be problematic. Suen (1997) provided a 
detailed discussion of the issue. Statistically, he argued that “the decomposition is unbiased only 
when percentile ranks are independent of the standard deviation of [residual wages]”. In fact, such 
independence may not hold in general, because, if the wage dispersion (“price of skills”) changes, 
the gap in percentile rank (“skill”) may change. Thus, the meaning of decomposing wage residuals 
would be lost. The method will produce a false impression that the “unmeasured skill diﬀerentials” 
have declined while the “skill price” has risen (and vice versa) if the wage distribution becomes 
more (less) dispersed. More importantly, the decomposition implicitly assumes that labor market 
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discrimination is unimportant. Using Urban Household Income Surveys, Gustafsson and Li (2000) 
showed that the increase in the gender earnings gap in urban China between 1988 and 1995 was 
driven by increased earnings inequality, instead of a deterioration in the relative position of females 
in the earnings distribution.  
To summarize, the decomposition formula presented in Eq. (6) is applied to the cross-sectional 
data by region so as to provide an overview of the gender earnings diﬀerentials across regions. The 
decomposition in Eq. (7) is then applied seeking to explain: (i) the importance of changes in 
productivity-related characteristics, and that of changes in the returns to these characteristics in 
contributing to the change in gender earnings diﬀerentials over time by region; and (ii) the relative 
position of females and males in the reward system across regions during the reform period. To 
provide a thorough understanding of the changes in the earning diﬀerentials across regions, the 
period of study is subdivided into two sub-periods 1995-2002, and 2002-2007.  
2.3.2 Data  
The data used in this study come from the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) for 
1995, 2002, and 2007 conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). CHIP data 
have been widely used in the literature for studying income, wealth and labor market outcomes in 
China. CHIP consists of both urban and rural surveys.  CHIP collects rich information on 
individual’s income, age, marital status, educational attainment, years of schooling, ownership 
structure of employer, industrial sector, occupational position, etc.  
To examine the labor market outcomes of privatization, it is important to measure 
privatization properly. Since mid-1990s, privatization of SOEs has dramatically changed the 
ownership structure of enterprises and the structure of industrial sector. A distinct feature of 
China’s privatization is that the government has adopted various privatization methods to suit the 
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sizes of SOEs. As a result, privatization reform has produced many different ownership forms of 
enterprises. Definitions of various business registration status by ownership classification are 
shown in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1 Definition of Enterprises of Registration Status by Ownership 
Ownership Classification  Registration Status 
State-owned Enterprises(SOEs) 
(1) solely state-owned enterprises; (2) state holding 
enterprises; (3) state holding joint venture 
Government Agencies and Institutions(GAIs) 
(1) government and party agencies; (2) state and 
collective institutions 
Urban Collective Enterprises(UCEs) 
(1) solely collective-owned enterprises; (2) 
collective holding enterprises; (3) collective 
holding joint venture 
Private/Individual Enterprises(PIEs) 
(1) solely private-owned enterprises; (2) private 
holding enterprises; (3) private holding joint 
venture; (4) self-employed Individuals 
Foreign Invest Enterprises(FIEs) 
(1) solely foreign-owned enterprises; (2) foreign 
holding joint venture 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2001). 
Based on the definitions provided by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), enterprises 
are classified into five different categories, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), government agencies 
or institutions (GAIs), urban collective enterprises (UCEs), private or individual enterprises 
(PIEs), and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs).  Each categories include two or more ownership 
types of enterprises. State sector include SOEs and GAIs, whereas UCEs, PIEs and FIEs are non-
state owned enterprises. According to China Statistical Yearbook, SOEs can be either wholly state-
funded or partially owned by the government (with two thirds or more assets share owned by the 
state). Due to restrictive information on FIEs, only solely foreign-invested companies and foreign-
owned joint-venture companies are considered in our analysis. 
The rapid growth of non-state sector has become the most important factor driving the 
economic growth of China. The share of industrial output produced by the non-state sector 
increases from about 32.5% in 1985 to more than 77.6% in 2008 (Fan & Hope, 2013). The state 
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sector, in contrast, the share of the state sector’s contribution and the employment share of state 
sector have declined. National Bureau of Statistics of China shows that between 1990 and 2010, 
the share of state-sector employment in urban areas falls from 70.0% to 21.7%. Previous studies 
evaluate the development of economic reform by ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) in total 
investment (Graham and Wada 2001; Lessmann 2013). One of the disadvantages using the share 
of FDI in total investment as indicator is that it would underestimate the contribution of domestic 
and other forms of private enterprises to economic development. Cao et al. (1999) show that fast 
growing of Regional Gross Value Added (RGVA) in coastal regions is highly dependent on the 
development of domestic owned private enterprises. Private enterprises can also be formed of 
domestic-foreign joint ventures and domestic-foreign share-holding; both ownership structures 
proved to be the most productive in urban China (Estrin et al. 2009). Therefore, the progress of 
economic transition by privatization would be a better measurement than FDI-related ones. Other 
studies measure the privatization by the number of privatized enterprises or share issue 
privatization (SIP). The measurement by the number of privatized firms is not accurate because it 
does not take into account the size of firms. This is especially true in China as privatization have 
taken different methods for different size of firms. And SIP is used for large SOEs and only 
accounts for one third of privatization (Gan 2009).   
Following the method introduced in Zhou (2016), we use the share of employment of non-
SOEs in total employment to measure the effects of privatization on ownership structure at 
provincial level. The reasons are twofold. First, due to lack of information. There is no firm level 
data in CHIPs survey, such as the performance of firms, profits/assets ratio, and share owned by 
the state if privatized. Second, privatization implies resource allocation - reallocating surplus labor 
from SOEs to private firms, and non-state sector has absorbed increasingly laid-oﬀ SOE workers. 
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Thus, the expanded employment in non-state sector reflects the pace and development of 
privatization. For each year, we estimate the employment share in non-state sector at city level, 
and differences in employment share across region is used to identify the extent of privatization. 
Based on our calculation of privatization, survey areas are classified into three categories, low, 
moderate and high privatized. More important, the panel structure of the data gives a better picture 
on the changes in privatization process over time. Table 2.2 summarizes the non-state share of 
employment in total employment for the three privatization categories in this study. Simple 
comparisons across three years suggest that the share of non-state employment increases with the 
progress of privatization reform. Our analysis consists both a trend analysis and a cross-sectional 
comparison of privatized regions. In the trend analysis, there are increasing share of non-state 
workers over the period of study. The average share of non-state workers is 34.2%, 52.8% and 
73.0% in 1995, 2002 and 2007, respectively. Table 2.2 also shows the share of both low and 
moderate regions decline as the privatization reform moves forward. In 1995, there are 70.2% of 
observations in low regions and it covers most of the survey areas. Three provinces (Jiangsu, 
Guangdong and Liaoning) out of eleven are listed in the moderate region and none in high region. 
The proportion of low region declines sharply to 21.8% in 2002. From 1995 to 2002, the 
observations of moderate regions increases from 29.8% to 60.2%, or from 2,840 to 4,873. Since 
the rising employment share in non-state sector reflects the privatization progress, we are able to 
construct the measurement across geographic locations and over time.  
This study focuses on urban samples because there is a large income gap between urban and 
rural residents. One of the most prominent structural features of contemporary China is the division 
between the rural and urban sectors, institutionalized by the household residential registration 
(Hukou) system. The establishment of Hukou system restricts free labor mobility across rural-
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urban sectors and causes large urban/rural income gap. Heterogeneity between the two groups is 
too large to study the gender gap. Thus we exclude rural residents from our sample. We further 
restrict the sample to urban residents with urban registration (Hukou) and exclude rural-urban 
migrant households for two reasons. First, the lack of analytical data for rural-urban migrants in 
1995 doesn’t serve the purpose of comparison. Second, wage structures for migrants are expected 
to be very diﬀerent from urban residents (Gustafsson and Li 2000). 
Table 2.2 Summary Statistics of Privatization Indicators 
 1995 2002 2007 
Low Region 0.302 0.385 . 
 (0.053) (0.033) . 
No. of Obs. 6,699 1,749 . 
Moderate Region 0.435 0.539 0.613 
 (0.043) (0.057) (0.024) 
No. of Obs. 2,840 4,784 1,879 
High Region . 0.662 0.781 
 . (0.016) (0.064) 
No. of Obs. . 1,461 4,347 
Total 0.342 0.528 0.730 
 (0.079) (0.100) (0.095) 
No. of Obs. 9,539 7,994 6,226 
Note:  Privatized Index is measured by private share of employment for each province. Standard errors 
in parenthesis. 
Since the primary objective of the present study is to examine gender earnings diﬀerentials 
among working individuals, we restrict our sample to full-time working adults aged 16 to 60.7 The 
minimum age for employment is 16 by law in China; while the mandatory retirement age could be 
extended with Party committee approval, the retirement age is 60 in general.8 Self-employed 
individuals, rehired retirees, and household workers are excluded because only annual earnings 
(including non-labor income) are reported. In our study, monthly earning is served as the 
                                                 
7 The number of weekly working hours is used as a proxy to control for full-time employment, and we limit it within 
the range between 35 and 75 hours.  
8 The announced maximum age is extended to 65 for men and 60 for women, depending on ranks.  
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dependent variable because we can’t construct hourly income.9 Monthly earning is calculated by 
the sum of individual salary, bonus, subsidies, and in-kind income related to work, and does not 
include non-labor peculiar beneﬁts like pension, hardship subsidy, insurance for health and 
housing. All nominal wage incomes are adjusted into 1995 price level, based on urban consumer 
price indices published by the NBS. To control for biases arising from extreme values in the log 
of monthly earnings, we excluded observations that were more than three standard deviations 
below or above the mean.  
We control for age in wage equation. As noted in Oaxaca and Regan (2009), potential work 
experience is commonly used as proxy for actual work experience in literature to estimate Mincer 
earning’s equation.  However, they point out potential whether or not it is reasonable to assume 
that individuals participating in the labor force right after leaving school. What’s more, they show 
that in the presence of specification errors as opposed to classical errors-in-variables problems, 
age variable may be preferred over potential experience. For each survey year, four age groups 
(16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46 and older) are considered. Education is one of the traditional human 
capital theory variables, which acts as a proxy for individual competence. In this paper, education 
attainment is a categorical variable indicating the highest educational degree achieved by an 
individual, with “high school and dropouts” as the reference group. We also include other socio-
economic variables like marital status (equals to one if one is married, zero otherwise), ownership 
structure of the employers (equals to one if one works for state sector, zero otherwise), nature of 
jobs (equals to one if the contract is permanent, zero otherwise), occupation and industry sectors 
Two types of ownership have been deﬁned in this study. State sector includes government 
agencies, institutes, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Non-state sector includes private sector, 
                                                 
9 There is no information of the monthly working hours available in the CHIP survey.  
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new-formed sector and others. Private sector includes collective-owned enterprise, private 
enterprise, or foreign invested enterprise. New-formed sector includes share-holding and joint 
venture enterprises. From 1978 to 2006, non-state share in GDP increases from 22.4% to 88.9%. 
The development of the non-state sector provides remarkable support to the economic and 
employment growth in economic transition (Tusneem 2003). And faster development of non-state 
enterprise sector is associated with a further liberalized market and a better institutional 
environment (Cao, Qian, and Weingast 1999). The occupation and industry codes reported in the 
CHIP survey are used to create occupation and industry variables for each person in the sample. 
In our study, we sort workers into four occupational categories and five industry sectors. 10 The 
ﬁnal sample includes 5,091 men and 4,448 women in 1995; 4,530 men and 3,464 women in 2002; 
and 3,595 men and 2,631 women in 2007. We ﬁnd that both men and women experienced a 
dramatic decline in the labor market participation rate (from 97% in 1995for men and women to 
89% for men and 81% for women in 2007). The rate declined much more sharply for women than 
for men. It is likely that more low-skilled women than low-skilled men exited from employment 
over time. Table 2.3 reports the logarithm of average monthly wage for both men and women by 
regions. Comparisons over period of study from 1995, 2002 to 2007 gives us a dynamic 
perspective on the progress of economic transition as well as its impacts on earnings. Regardless 
of region, men earn more than women during the period of study.  
Consistent with other studies, we notice that gender wage gap increases over the period of 
study, from 18.2% in 1995 to 20.7% in 2002 and further to 28.9% in 2007. And gender wage 
diﬀerentials increase in all three regions over time. However, there are also regional diﬀerences in 
                                                 
10 In our sample, occupations are coded into professional and highly skilled technicians, director or manager, office 
staff, and low-skilled labor; industry sectors are manufactory, commercial and retail, education, cultural and art, 
public service and financial and other consulting service. 
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earnings, both men and women earn more when they reside in more advanced region. In 1995, for 
example, the average monthly earnings for men and women in moderate privatized region are 
603.0 and 485.9; and the average earnings for men and women in low region are 475.8 and 399.0, 
respectively.11 A possible explanation is higher market eﬃciency in more privatized region. It’s 
noticeable that the gender wage diﬀerentials increase as privatization progresses and that larger 
wage gap is observed in more highly privatized regions. In 2002, for example, the gender gap is 
0.172 log points, indicating that women earn 85.2% of what men do in low privatized region. The 
gender gap for moderate region is 0.246 percentage points, or the earnings for women only are 
78.2% of what men are paid. There is a remarkable increase in gender earning gap in high 
privatized region, and the earnings gap increases from 0.205 log points in 2002 to 0.295 in 2007.  
Table 2.3 Summary Statistics of Log Earnings by Privatized Regions 
 1995 2002 2007 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Low Region 6.165 5.989 6.600 6.428 . . 
 (0.557) (0.606) (0.533) (0.559) . . 
No. of Obs. 3,576 3,123 1,515 1,325 . . 
Moderate Region 6.402 6.186 6.631 6.385 6.747 6.494 
 (0.598) (0.601) (0.573) (0.605) (0.661) (0.619) 
No. of Obs. 983 766 2,764 2,020 783 678 
High Region . . 7.172 6.967 7.125 6.830 
 . . (0.563) (0.578) (0.685) (0.649) 
No. of Obs. . . 1,058 821 2,537 1,810 
Total 6.284 6.087 6.801 6.593 6.936 6.662 
 (0.577) (0.603) (0.556) (0.581) (0.673) (0.634) 
No. of Obs. 5,091 4,448 4,530 3,464 3,595 2,631 
Note: Standard errors are in the parenthesis. 
The average log wage earnings of our sample is breakdown by labor market characteristics in 
privatized regions.12 Obviously the economic institutional reform in late 1990s have greater impact 
on women than men. The magnitude of the shift was much more pronounced for women, especially 
for women over 45. Younger retirement age than men and higher risk of being laid oﬀ both account 
                                                 
11 Measured by Chinese Currency (RMB). 
12 Full tables are provided in Appendix B. 
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for the larger decline in woman’s employment rate. Appleton et al. (2002) documented that the 
incident rate of layoﬀ was 12% for men and 22% for women. After losing their jobs, many people 
left the labor market for good. Monthly wage premiums for education in both men and women 
were higher in more privatized region. Their ﬁndings also support the idea that productive 
characteristics have been under-rewarded in planned economy. The narrowing education gap 
suggests that the negative impact of economic transition on less educated women is greater than 
that on less educated men. Our data indicate that the smallest gender gap occurs in the youngest 
age group, and that the gap widens as the age increases. Our ﬁndings are consistent in all regions 
and over the period of study. One potential issue that is largely ignored by previous studies on the 
Chinese gender earning gap is the diﬀerence in mandatory retirement age between men and 
women. It is set at 60 for men and 55 for women in the state sector. Diﬀerences in retiring age 
between men and women further enlarge the gender earnings gap, as senior workers tend to be 
paid more than junior workers. Our data also show the earnings gap appears to be smaller between 
men and women with more education, but the gaps for all education groups are getting larger from 
1995 to 2007. Women in the low privatized region have more college and professional or 
vocational (post-secondary) education, which contributes to narrowing the gender earning gap. It 
is clear that women are less likely to hold managerial positions for all privatized regions. The wage 
gap between married men and married women are greater than other marital status in all privatized 
regions and such trend appears consistent over the entire period of study. Gender earning gap in 
both state sector and private sector increase from 1995 to 2007 in all three privatized regions. 
However, earnings diﬀerentials between men and women are smaller in state sector than private 
sector. Because men have a higher probability of working in the state sector than women, changes 
in the relative earnings of workers in the state sector aﬀect the gender earning gap. 
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2.4  Empirical Results  
2.4.1 Regression Analysis on Wage Gaps by Gender  
Before proceeding to the analysis, to ensure that the gender wage gap is not affected by 
differences in labor market participation, we measure the male and female workers’ labor force 
participation rates for each privatized region across over the period of study. Although urban labor 
force participation remains consistently high, the mean level of labor force participation declines 
for both men and women. We also observe pattern of men’s labor force participation is similar to 
women’s between 1995 and 2007. As discussed above, we conclude that rising gender wage gap 
in urban China are not attributable to the changes in gender differences in labor force participation. 
To determine whether the gender wage gap is due to gender, we first conduct multiple 
regression analyses in which gender is treated as a dummy variable (one for female) and with a 
number of control variables, such as marital status, education attainment, the ownership structure 
of work-unit, etc. We regress both personal and job characteristics against the natural logarithm of 
wage earnings for each privatized region in 1995, 2002 and 2007, separately.  
Table 2.4 summarizes the regression results. Since we are interested in the gender wage gap 
and its determinants, only the coefficients of female are reported. Column 1 of Table 2.4 reports 
the total gender wage gap, that is, without controls for any observable characteristics. As expected, 
gender wage gap increases for regions over time. For moderate region, the gender wage gap of 
moderate privatized region increases from 21.7% in 1995 to 24.6% in 2002, and further to 25.2% 
in 2007. And the gap increases more from 20.5% to 29.6% for high region, between 2002 and 
2007.  
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Table 2.4 Regression Analysis on the Gender Wage Gap 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Low Privatized Region  
 1995 
Female -0.177*** -0.118*** -0.129*** -0.128*** -0.109*** -0.092*** -0.096*** 
  (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 2002 
Female -0.174*** -0.140*** -0.143*** -0.124*** -0.120*** -0.115*** -0.128*** 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) 
Moderate Privatized Region 
 1995 
Female -0.217*** -0.177*** -0.191*** -0.187*** -0.176*** -0.152*** -0.162 
  (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
 2002 
Female -0.246*** -0.207*** -0.213*** -0.185*** -0.181*** -0.168*** -0.172*** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
 2007 
Female -0.252*** -0.270*** -0.279*** -0.257*** -0.256*** -0.244*** -0.229*** 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
High Privatized Region 
 2002 
Female -0.205*** -0.207*** -0.213*** -0.185*** -0.181*** -0.168*** -0.172*** 
  (0.030) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
 2007 
Female -0.296*** -0.326*** -0.342*** -0.323*** -0.321*** -0.298*** -0.290*** 
  (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Controls               
Age - yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Marital Status - - yes yes yes yes yes 
Nature of Jobs - - - yes yes yes yes 
Ownership - - - - yes yes yes 
Education - - - - - yes yes 
Industry& Occupation - - - - - - yes 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
Moreover, we find that privatization progress in urban China widens the gender wage gaps. 
And the more privatization the region is, the large gap is. Our results are not surprising, since the 
booming non-state sector absorbs a large amount of low skilled workers laid off from the reform, 
thus the employment share of low skilled workers increases a lot in more privatized region. 
Previous study shows that the gender wage gap is even larger for low-skilled workers in urban 
China (Zhang, et al., 2008). As discussed before, difference in observed wages between males and 
females can be explained by gender differences in wage-related characteristics. To investigate the 
impact of each factor on the gender wage differentials, sequential regressions are performed by 
adding one of the control variables (age-group, marital status, the nature of jobs, education, 
employer’s ownership, etc.) at a time, the coefficients are presented from column (2) to column 
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(8). As shown of column (2) in the upper panel, the inclusion of age variable reduces the raw 
gender gap without controlling for any characteristics by approximately 50% in 1995 (from 17.7% 
to 11.8%) and by 24.3% in 2002 (from 17.4% to 14.0%) for low privatized region. Empirically, 
age is commonly regarded as indicative of work experience. The significant decline in wage gaps 
imply that gender differences in work experience explains a significant portion of the wage gap in 
low privatized region. The results suggest that age also plays an important role explaining the wage 
gap for moderate privatized region. However, it is worth mentioning that the gender wage gap 
widens at the panel of high privatized region. We observe that, by including age variable, the 
gender wage gap increases slightly by 0.2 percentage point to 20.7% in 2002, and by 3 percentage 
point to 32.6% in 2007. One potential explanation is the fact that there are substantial numbers of 
workers are employed by state-owned enterprises in low and moderate privatized region, 
especially at the earlier stage of privatization reform. Wages of state employees are institutionally 
determined according to a national systems of ranking, scales and seniority, with education and 
skill receiving little reward (Knight & Song, 1993). And the age-wage profile of female workers 
in state-owned enterprises is similar to that of male workers, implying a convergence in the returns 
to experience and smaller gender wage gap for senior workers. By contrast, the wages of workers 
in private sectors are determined by productivity. As women reduced their commitment to the 
labor force, it is possible that discrimination against them increased, or changes in unobservable 
skills such as gender-specific human capital investment widened the gender earnings gap. As a 
result, we expect that wage inequalities will be much larger in high privatized region, where most 
workers are employed in non-state enterprises. 
The coefficients of inclusion marital status in column (3) suggest that men receive a marriage 
premium while women do not, and marital status contributes to a wider gender wage gap. The 
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gender wage gaps of workers with permanent positions and workers employed at state sector are 
smaller, however the contribution to the wage gap declines over time. Column (6) indicates that 
the gender wage gap falls for all regions when we control for education. We observe the most 
significant drop from 32.1% to 29.8% suggests that gender difference in college premium explains 
a significant portion of the gender wage gap for high privatized region in 2007. Our results also 
show that gender wage gap shrinks with educational attainment. That is because female workers 
are, on average, less educated than male workers, and the returns to higher education is higher for 
female workers (Li and Song 2013). The regression results with controlling for industry and job 
occupation are shown in the last columns. It is interesting to see that inclusion of industry and 
occupation variables have very small effects on the gender wage gap. A possible reason for the 
neglect change in coefficients of column (7) that both industry sectors and occupations are not 
narrowly defined in our dataset. And it is common to find that the gender pay gaps are quite small 
within narrowly defined industries and occupations (Gunderson 1989). Our ﬁndings highlight the 
fact that decentralization of wage setting generally allows more room for discriminatory practices. 
Thus the diﬀerentials widen with further privatized reforms. One potential explanation for the 
steady deterioration of female workers at the bottom of the earnings distribution is that lower-paid 
women are more likely to work in sectors with relatively slow earnings growth. Another potential 
explanation is the increase in the price of unobserved skill. As long as women’s level of 
unobserved skills is lower than that of men, a rising price will widen the gender earning gap at 
both the bottom and the top of the earnings distribution. 
2.4.2 Results of Male and Female Wage Functions 
To examine which personal and employment characteristics are important determinants of the 
gender wage gap, we carry out estimations of the wage equations for male and female workers 
58 
separately. The regression results by privatized region and at different point of time are shown in 
Table 2.5. There are many results worth commenting on, the coefficients of age dummies measure 
the average differences between two age groups. Male and female workers aged between 46 and 
60 are the reference group.  In this specification, positive (negative) coefficient indicates higher 
(lower) wage earning, compared to the oldest age group. According to the estimated results, age 
clearly influences wage for both men and women over the period of study, especially in the year 
of 1995. The age coeﬃcients also represent the age-earning proﬁle. The results suggest that the 
profiles are somewhat steeper for women, especially for whom in low privatized region of 1995. 
Age is used as proxy for work experience for our analysis. By this measure, wages grow at a faster 
rate for women than for men in that group, as more experiences accumulate. In other words, the 
widest wage gap between the oldest and the youngest are in the region with the lowest level of 
privatization. Our findings supports that seniority is the most important factor determining wages 
under the central planned system.  The coefficients of age at two different time points suggest that 
the profiles change over time for both men and women. In 1995, women have steeper age-earnings 
profiles than men at low and moderate privatized regions. However, the age-earnings profiles are 
flatter for female workers than which for male workers in 2007, at each privatized region. The 
changes in the shape of earnings profile reflect the impact of privatized reform on wage structure 
in the urban labor market of China. From 1998 to 2003, a total of 28.18 million persons had been 
laid off from the SOEs, of which 13.36 million were women (State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China 2004). Because the decline in women’s employment prospect shortens women’s 
working life, it discourages women’s human capital investment. If differences in human capital 
investments play an important role in determining the size of the gender earnings gap, the theory 
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would predict female workers have a flatter age-earnings profiles than male workers. Our 
regression results support the prediction of theory. 
Married women’s intermittent labor force participation is the most common explanation for 
wider gender wage gaps experienced by married women compared to their single counterparts in 
most developed countries. Because the labor force participation and attachment of Chinese women 
does not vary significantly with marital status (Liu 2011), the theory predicts that high labor force 
participation and attachment of both single and married Chinese women should have yield the 
same gender wage gap. Our results show that the average monthly income for married men is 
higher than unmarried men. For instance, the marriage premium for men is 25.7% in low and 
27.5% in moderate privatized region of 1995. However, the differences in earnings between 
married and single women are not statistically significant for any privatized regions. We suggest 
that the gender wage gap is larger for married women in urban China, despite the fact that female 
workers exhibit strong and continuous labor force attachment. Another noticeable of the regression 
results is the coefficients on education attainment. As expected, the higher the education level, the 
more a worker earned. The coefficients also suggest that return to education increases from 1995 
to 2007 for both men and women. Table 2.5 shows that in 1995, compared to high school and 
dropouts, the college graduates earn 17.2% more for men and 26.4% more for women in low 
private region. By 2002, the earning gaps between college and high school graduates in low 
privatized region increase to 22.1% for men and 31.8% for women. Our results supports the 
importance of education in wage earnings, especially in post-reform China (Khan, et al., 1999). 
The estimated coefficients of College variable suggest that women’s return to education is higher 
than men’s in all regions. Our findings are in line with the results of earlier studies indicating that 
the returns to additional years of schooling were higher for women in China (Maurer-Fazio 1999; 
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Li 2003). We thus believe that education influences earnings of females than of males in China’s 
urban labor market. Regression results reported in Table also show returns to education is 
positively associated with implementation of economic reforms. In 2007, the college premium for 
men slightly increases from 44.7% in moderate to 47.7% in high privatized region. And the wage 
premium for college degree has increased greatly for women, as the progress of privatization. In 
2007, from moderate to high privatized region, the college premium increases from 44.9% to 
58.8% for female workers. Given the disparities in returns to education across different regions 
are more prominent over time and over the stage of privatization progress, we expect that 
substantial heterogeneity in wage distribution across regions in urban China.  
Even though there were a remarkable transformation in China’s economy, it was still 
dominated by state sector and workers in state sector earned a considerable premium than whom 
in non-state sector (Xia et al. 2014). In 1995, the wage premium of state sector is 32.9% and 28.4% 
for men and women, respectively. The coefficients of state-owned sector suggest the size of the 
premium decreases over time and not statistically significant in 2007. We believe that the changes 
in state sector wage premium is due to the changes in the employment share of state sector. Table 
2.5 shows that state sector share of employment share declines from 84.4% and 77.7% for male 
and female workers in 1995, to 71.3% and 64.1% in 2002, and further falls to 41.4% and 35.8% 
in 2007.  Given the effects of state sector on wage differentials in urban China, we believe that the 
contribution of ownership to gender wage gap is substantial at the early stage of privatization 
reform. The coefficients of occupation and industry Variables suggest that the gender wage gaps 
within the same occupation and industry vary by time. It is interesting that women receive higher 
wage earnings than men if they take the position with advanced skills, like professional and 
technician, or the position of direction or manager.  
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Table 2.5 Estimates of Wage Earnings for Men and Women in Three Privatized Regions 
 Low Moderate High 
 1995 2002 1995 2002 2007 2002 2007 
 M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
Intercept 5.734*** 5.609*** 6.113*** 5.987*** 6.131*** 5.987*** 6.311*** 6.109*** 6.291*** 6.032*** 6.672*** 6.658*** 6.602*** 6.292*** 
 (0.052) (0.056) (0.085) (0.081) (0.088) (0.089) (0.051) (0.062) (0.080) (0.088) (0.092) (0.092) (0.054) (0.060) 
Age Group               
16-25 -0.455*** -0.497*** -0.216* -0.348 -0.302*** -0.333*** -0.329*** -0.319*** -0.171 0.03 -0.083 -0.182 -0.139* -0.023 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.094) (0.095) (0.088) (0.083) (0.063) (0.068) (0.110) (0.099) (0.108) (0.103) (0.066) (0.065) 
26-35 -0.312*** -0.191*** -0.115** -0.115* -0.185*** 0.117* -0.153 -0.162*** 0.149** 0.152** 0.035 -0.124* 0.083* 0.133** 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.044) (0.052) (0.044) (0.052) (0.029) (0.035) (0.055) (0.058) (0.067) (0.061) (0.037) (0.043) 
36-45 -0.105*** -0.032 -0.039 -0.017 -0.063 0.236*** -0.053 -0.080* -0.026 0.072 0.023 -0.144** 0.120*** 0.088* 
 (0.021) 0.027 (0.035) (0.046) (0.036) (0.047) (0.023) (0.031) (0.044) (0.053) (0.042) (0.048) (0.031) (0.039) 
Ownership Sector               
State-Owned 0.284*** 0.250*** 0.082* -0.007 0.026 0.039 0.136*** 0.108*** -0.103* 0.010 -0.020 0.064 0.012 0.034 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.040) (0.043) (0.042) (0.039) (0.024) (0.028) (0.045) (0.046) (0.043) (0.046) (0.031) (0.034) 
Education               
College and above 0.172*** 0.264*** 0.243*** 0.276*** 0.200** 0.160 0.360*** 0.451*** 0.447*** 0.449*** 0.324*** 0.436*** 0.477*** 0.588*** 
 (0.032) (0.048) (0.056) (0.073) (0.061) (0.092) (0.037) (0.054) (0.058) (0.068) (0.067) (0.088) (0.040) (0.046) 
Professional School 0.076*** 0.138*** 0.078* 0.187*** 0.089* 0.230*** 0.154*** 0.204*** 0.181*** 0.246*** 0.128** 0.176*** 0.230*** 0.329*** 
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.039) (0.044) (0.037) (0.046) (0.025) (0.030) (0.045) (0.048) (0.046) (0.048) (0.031) (0.035) 
Occupation               
Professional or Technician 0.096*** 0.223*** 0.167*** 0.236*** 0.055 0.162** 0.115*** 0.201*** 0.205*** 0.201*** 0.342*** 0.312*** 0.205*** 0.273*** 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.051) (0.053) (0.047) (0.054) (0.031) (0.038) (0.051) (0.061) (0.058) (0.061) (0.035) (0.041) 
Director of Government 0.127*** 0.283*** 0.216*** 0.236** 0.237*** 0.391*** 0.162*** 0.252*** 0.326*** 0.237* 0.432*** 0.519*** 0.420*** 0.250** 
 (0.028) (0.044) (0.051) (0.081) (0.050) (0.083) (0.035) (0.062) (0.073) (0.105) (0.061) (0.094) (0.051) (0.076) 
Office Stuff 0.007 0.126*** 0.066 0.042 0.131** 0.120** 0.042 0.141*** 0.155** 0.167** 0.260*** 0.243*** 0.118*** 0.166*** 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.049) (0.054) (0.044) (0.045) (0.030) (0.033) (0.054) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053) (0.034) (0.036) 
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Together with the fact that the return in higher education (especially with college and above) is 
higher, we believe that women in urban China are more incentive to invest in human capital. 
2.4.3 The Decomposition Analysis of Gender Earnings Differentials 
Following the Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) approach, we decompose the gender wage gap (R) 
into two components; the first is due to gender differences in the characteristic endowments (E), 
and the second is due to differences in the coefficients (C) of the wage function which can be 
attributed to the labor-market discrimination and to other omitted variables. The first component 
is commonly regarded as explained component, and the second is regarded as unexplained or 
discrimination component. Table 2.6 reports the decomposition results and the relative 
contribution of endowments and unexplained components (or discrimination) by privatized region 
for 1995, 2002, and 2007. 
Table 2.6 Contribution of Different Components to Gender Wage Gaps 
  1995 2002 2007 
  Low Moderate Low Moderate High 
Moderat
e 
High 
Raw differential 
(R): 
0.179*** 
(0.014) 
0.217*** 
(0.024) 
0.174*** 
(0.026) 
0.246*** 
(0.017) 
0.205*** 
(0.030) 
0.252*** 
(0.030) 
0.296*** 
(0.020) 
-Due to 
Endowments (E) 
0.089*** 
(0.008) 
0.070*** 
(0.012) 
0.066*** 
(0.012) 
0.093*** 
(0.010) 
0.035** 
(0.016) 
0.049*** 
(0.016) 
0.041*** 
(0.016) 
-Due to 
Coefficients (C) 
0.090*** 
(0.012) 
0.147*** 
(0.012) 
0.108*** 
(0.012) 
0.153*** 
(0.014) 
0.170*** 
(0.026) 
0.203*** 
(0.025) 
0.255*** 
(0.018) 
E as % Total  49.7% 32.3% 37.9% 37.8% 17.1% 19.4% 13.9% 
C as % Total  50.3% 67.7% 62.1% 62.2% 82.9% 80.6% 86.1% 
Note: The numbers in the first three rows indicate what percent the wages of male workers are higher than 
those of female workers. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: CHIP urban household data, 1995, 2002, 
and 2007.  
 
The first row of Table 2.6 indicates that the raw gender wage gaps increases for all regions, 
and this increase has been especially sharp for high privatized region between 1995 and 2007. As 
shown in the bottom panel, the gender differences in characteristic endowments explain 49.7% in 
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1995 and 37.9% in 2002 for the low privatized region. Meanwhile, the share of the wage gap due 
to differences in the coefficients (or discrimination) increases from 50.3% to 62.1%. Our results 
suggest that while the gender wage gap increases over the study period, the contribution of 
endowment differences to the gender wage gap declines. By the end of 2007, only 19.7% and 
13.9% of the wage differentials are attributable to endowment differences in moderate and high 
privatized region, respectively. Since the results of the endowment component mirrored those of 
the discrimination component, as indicated by the results shown in the lower panel, discrimination 
is relatively more serious in 2007. Our results highlights the fact that discrimination against women 
in urban China gets worse over time. 
Table 2.6 also illustrates the impact of the privatization process on gender pay gap. Indeed, 
the relative importance of endowments in explaining wage gap is reversely related to privatized 
progress, and discrimination against women is higher in more privatized region. Of the overall 
gender wage gap, the differences in characteristic endowments between males and females account 
for 49.7% for low and 37.9% for moderate region in 1995. In the meantime, the fraction of wage 
gap due to discrimination is greater in more privatized region. In 2002, more than 82.0% of the 
wage gap cannot be explained by endowment differences for high privatized region, compared to 
62.2% for moderate and 62.1% for low region. Our results suggest that discrimination against 
women is more likely in the regions with more non-state enterprises. The privatization reform on 
state-owned enterprises has speed up the process of transition to market-oriented economy and 
encourages the growth of non-state sector, which consists of collective enterprises, private or 
individual enterprises, and foreign-invested enterprises. However, the impact of privatization 
reform on gender wage gap and gender wage discrimination remains unclear. On one hand, the 
decentralization of wage setting provides room for discrimination. On the other hand, privatization 
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reform on state-owned sector promotes economic competition and performance efficiency. 
Therefore, in contrast to decentralization, competition associated with the reform can be 
considered a force tending to minimize discrimination. The magnitude of “decentralization” and 
“competition” effects would vary by region with different scale of economic reform. Our results 
suggest that, for low privatized region, “competition” effect dominates the “decentralization” 
effect region at the early stage of reform such that the least discrimination against women is 
estimated. With further economic development in regions with larger scale of privatization, the 
effect of “decentralization” override that of “competition” has worsened gender discrimination. 
Decomposing gender earnings differentials into endowment differences and discrimination 
phenomena allows exploring the determinants of the gender wage gap for different privatized 
region at different point of time. Further decomposition of the gender wage differentials into 
various sub-components suggests that working experience, education, and occupation are the main 
contributors to the explained component for all three regions between 1995 and 2007. More 
importantly, no less than 40% of the explained earnings differential is attributable to the 
differences in working experience between the gender groups. Education is found to be more 
important in influencing the earnings of females than of males in all regions, and the fraction of 
gender differences in education is smaller for more privatized region. A declining trend of 
enterprise ownership factor in the explained component highlights the role of institutional reform 
in shaping the market structure in urban China.  
Unlike previous findings arguing that occupational segregation in China is not an issue (Liu 
et al. 2000; Liu 2011), we find that occupation plays an important role to explain the wage gap in 
China’s urban labor market. The decomposition results suggest that about one-fifth of the 
explained component of the gender earnings differential could be attributed to gender differences 
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in occupational distribution. Such strong effect of occupation in explaining the gender earnings 
differentials implies the labor market has been transforming towards a more competitive 
environment. Economic reform and economic development have facilitated the mobility of labor 
across occupations and types of enterprises. This is particularly the case of the high privatized 
region which includes more developed areas and most rapid growth of non-state owned 
enterprises. However, further examination of this issue in relation to gender discrimination is 
called for.  
2.4.4 Changes in Determinants to the Gender Wage Gap 
There are debates in the literature about the economic status of women during the process of 
economic transition. Some studies argued that women are disadvantaged (Blau and Kahn 1994), 
while others stated that women could also proportionately share more or less beneﬁts than that of 
men from the reform (Blau 1996).  
To see how these arguments are applicable to the privatized reform, it is more informative to 
examine the changes of gender wage differentials by region. Table 2.7 presents the overall results, 
as well as the computed decomposition components by region for the period of 1995-2002, and 
2002-2007. Following Wellington (1993) approach outlined in Equation (7) , the overall changes 
in gender wage gap are decomposed into the changes attributable to gender differences in 
characteristics endowments (component (a)-(b)), and the changes attributable to gender diﬀerences 
in the coefficients (component (c)-(d)). A positive sign in overall changes implies an increase in 
the wage gap over time. The bigger absolute value for component (c)-(d) indicates the relative 
importance of changes in wage structure in contributing to the overall changes. It suggests that the 
effect of “competition” dominates that of “decentralization” as the development and growth of 
non-state sector. The eﬀects from both labor market competitiveness and wage decentralization 
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are more prominent in the moderate region. Between 1995 and 2002, almost all changes in wage 
differentials (0.030 percentage points) are due to changes in endowment differences between men 
and women (0.029 percentage points for (a)-(b)). This conﬁrms the idea that the relative 
importance of competition at the early stage of reform. The increasing gender wage gap between 
2002 and 2007 implies the eﬀect of wage decentralization starts to take over and promote 
discriminatory practices. Contrary to the findings for the period between 1995 and 2002, changes 
in wage structure accounts for all the differences in wage gap.  
Table 2.7 Over Time Changes in Gender Earnings Differentials by Regions, 1995-2007 
  1995-2002 2002-2007 
High Privatized Region 
 Overall Changes  0.090 
  (a) Over time differences in male characteristics  0.014 
  (b) Over time differences in female characteristics  0.006 
 (a)-(b)  0.008 
  (c) Over time differences in the return to male characteristics  -0.051 
  (d) Over time differences in the return to female 
characteristics 
 -0.132 
 (c)-(d)   0.082 
Moderate Privatized Region 
 Overall Changes 0.030 0.006 
  (a) Over time differences in male characteristics 0.047 -0.003 
  (b) Over time differences in female characteristics 0.018 0.012 
 (a)-(b) 0.029 -0.015 
  (c) Over time differences in the return to male characteristics 0.203 0.120 
  (d) Over time differences in the return to female 
characteristics 
0.202 0.099 
 (c)-(d) 0.001 0.021 
Low Privatized Region 
 Overall Changes -0.005  
  (a) Over time differences in male characteristics 0.050  
  (b) Over time differences in female characteristics 0.055  
 (a)-(b) -0.005  
  (c) Over time differences in the return to male characteristics 0.577  
  (d) Over time differences in the return to female 
characteristics 
0.576  
 (c)-(d) 0.001   
Note: (a)-(b) denotes the changes in the diﬀerences attributable to characteristic endowments; (c)-(d) 
denotes the changes attributable to diﬀerences in the coefficients of the explanatory variables. 
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For high privatized region, as shown on the top panel, the gender wage gap increases between 
2002 and 2007. The decomposition results indicate that although increasingly competitive labor 
market enhanced the productivity-related characteristics (positive values of (a) and (b)), the 
accumulation is slightly higher for male workers (positive (a)-(b)). It is quite interesting to see that 
the returns to productivity-related characteristics declines for both men and women (both (c) and 
(d) are negative). The possible explanation would be experience becomes less important in wage 
determination, and the return to experience is over-rewarded prior to the reform in which payments 
for seniority have been a central feature of the pre-reform wage structure. Our results supports the 
idea that the transformation from planned to competitive market would led to productive 
characteristics being more effectively rewarded. The reform on state-owned enterprises also 
changes the structure of industrial sector and different ownership enterprises in urban China. And 
changes in wage structure has generated considerable unemployment and reshaped the 
composition of occupations for urban labor (Appleton et al. 2005). The results indicate that almost 
90.0% of the overall changes in wage gap is attributable to the changes in wage structure. 
For low privatized region, both characteristics endowment and the returns increase for both 
men and women (positive for component (a), (b), (c), and (d) at the bottom panel) between 1995 
and 2002. Greater access to education allows for greater investment in human capital, especially 
for females. The reducing gender gap in educational attainments contributes to narrowing the 
gender wage (negative (a)-(b)). Therefore, the increasing gender wage differentials is the result of 
the dominance of the wage decentralization effect which promotes discrimination practices. This 
is particularly the case at the early stage of reform (the negative value of component (a) - (b) is 
outweighed by the positive value of component (c) - (d)). Compared to the moderate privatized 
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region, the relatively slower pace of development suppress the eﬀect of wage decentralization, 
leading to smaller gender earnings diﬀerentials. 
In summary, there is a substantial improvement in productive characteristics for both male 
and female workers over time. The emergence of different ownership enterprises changes the wage 
structure in urban China, and the market appears to be evolving towards a competitive market 
similar to those found in OECD countries. With more competitive market environment, 
characteristics endowments are more appropriated rewarded at the earlier stage of reform. Further 
decomposition on the rise in the overall gender wage gap between 2002 and 2007 indicates that 
wage discrimination against women may have increased during that period. Appleton et al. (2002) 
show that women suffered more during retrenchment because they faced not only a higher risk of 
retrenchment but, if retrenched, they had a lower probability of re-employment than men. 
 
2.5  Conclusion  
Economic reforms and economic growth have dramatically raised the standard of living in 
urban China. On one hand, the decentralization of wage setting results in rising income inequality 
between women and men during economic transition. On the other hand, economic transformation 
stimulates market competition, which should reduce discrimination by penalizing the 
discriminatory wage setting behavior. The issue of gender wage diﬀerentials in China is thus 
complicated by this two conﬂicting forces during economic transition. Another feature of China’s 
emerging market economy is the large variation in local labor markets. Rates of foreign 
investment, employment, economic growth, and standard of living all vary dramatically. This 
study focuses on the evolution of the gender wage inequality by the progress of privatization in 
urban China.  
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Based on a representative sample of national data in 1995, 2002 and 2007, we come to the 
following conclusions: (1) the gender wage gap has increased over time; (2) women are 
consistently segregated to engage in low-pay sectors, occupations, and industries; (3) the gender 
gap is smallest in the low privatized region. We observe positive relationship between gender 
discrimination in wages and the progress of economic transition over the period of study. The 
greater gender discrimination is associated with higher privatization level in transition process. 
Women have strong incentives to improve productivity characteristics which are increasingly 
rewarded in a competitive market and thus would reduce the gap. The rising gender inequality may 
reﬂect the fact that wage decentralization leads to more discrimination. This is consistent with our 
ﬁnding that least privatized region has lowest level of gender discrimination. 
Following Wellington (1993), we further decompose the changes in the earnings gap over the 
period of t and t + a in the three privatized regions. The decomposition of gender wage diﬀerentials 
reveals that in the early stage of reform (1995-2002), the “competition” eﬀect dominates the 
“decentralization” eﬀect. Most of the changes can be explained by the changes in the mean 
characteristics between men and women. With further progress in privatization development, 
decentralization in wage setting dominates the “competition” eﬀect, resulting in a rising gap, 
especially in the highly privatized region. The growth of the discriminatory (unexplained) 
component by region closely follow the pace of regional reform and is consistent with the 
imbalance in regional growth during the second sub-period of study (2002-2007). The analysis of 
the decomposition of the trends in gender wage gap over time provides further support of a regional 
pattern of diﬀerentials that match the pattern of regional reforms. Widen gender wage gap is 
observed in more privatized region. With the growing importance of the discriminatory component 
in the cross-sectional results and the faster pace of privatization reform, one would expect the 
70 
diﬀerentials in urban China to grow continuously as China becomes more and more similar to 
OECD countries. The variations in discriminatory practices among the regions could have 
interesting implications for doing business in diﬀerent locations. The greater gender diﬀerentials 
in more privatized region tend to raise the costs of production. Unless very high proﬁt margins are 
available, competitive forces (Becker 1971), should act to push discriminatory employers out of 
business. Given that the information is extracted from national data sets, the generalization of the 
results from the restricted sample may not be an issue. However, with limited information on 
working hours, and no proxy for unobservable abilities and unmeasured skills, the present study 
is only able to provide an analysis of the lower bound on gender earnings diﬀerentials. With 
continuing growth in the all regions, patterns in the gender earnings gap in more recent years may 
deviate from those found in this study. This warrants further studies on these issues in the future.  
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Motherhood, Wages, and Wage Growth 
3.1 Introduction 
The presence of children, especially young ones, affects household behavior. One dimension 
of behavior that is most likely affected is female labor supply. As reported in BLS (2013) the labor 
force participation rate of women with children under 18 years old is 71.3%. It decreases to 64.0% 
for women with children under 6 years old, and 61.1% for women with children under 3 years old. 
Since most women have their first child in their twenties or early thirties, the lower labor force 
participation of mothers with young children is indicative that they leave employment during the 
prime period for career development when returns to work experience and labor market attachment 
are high. Not surprisingly there is evidence that female wages are affected by motherhood. 
Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2009) find that a first birth lowers female wages by 2 to 3 percent. 
It is this relationship between motherhood, the accumulation of work experience, and wages 
that is the focus of this paper. Our main contribution is to study questions raised across a number 
of papers in the literature within one consistent wage regression framework. This wage regression 
framework is supported by our careful tracking of career and family developments. This is made 
possible by the detailed work experience and fertility information available in the 1979 cohort of 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). It allows us to follow a cohort of women 
from their early twenties, when careers are launched and families are first formed, up until their 
mid to late forties, when careers are mostly established and new additions to families are unlikely. 
The simple age profiles of average wages show that the family gap appears in the mid-
twenties, and is mostly apparent when comparing early mothers (first birth before age 25) to non-
mothers (women who have no children). In fact the age-wage profile of late mothers (first birth at 
age 25 or after) is very similar to that of non-mothers. 
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There are two components to explaining these age-wage profiles. First, early mothers 
accumulate work experience at a much slower rate than non-mothers whereas late mothers slow 
their accumulation of work experience during their late twenties. Second, early mothers experience 
weaker returns to work experience relative to non-mothers. That is, even if they accumulated work 
experience at the same rate, they would nonetheless have lower wages. As for late mothers, returns 
to work experience accumulated before their transition to motherhood are stronger than the returns 
experienced by non-mothers. We find however that work experience accumulated after the 
transition to motherhood for late mothers brings smaller rewards. 
We then investigate two possible explanations to these returns to experience differentials. 
First, in a world where jobs have different occupational skill requirements, it is possible that 
mothers and non-mothers climb each skill ladder at different pace. We do find evidence that 
mothers tend to climb interpersonal skill ladder at a faster rate, and that early mothers climb the 
cognitive skill ladder at a slower rate. Accounting for this does not however change our finding of 
differential returns to work experience. 
Second if time spent out of employment is associated with the costly loss of employer- or 
occupational specific human capital, then mothers who tend to spend more time out of employment 
should be observed as experiencing weaker returns to work experience in a model that does not 
account for time spent out of employment. We however find that the differentials in returns to 
work experience are robust to controlling for time spent out of employment. 
We do not claim that our findings are causal estimates. They merely provide informative 
correlations between wages, work experience, and motherhood that are open to multiple 
interpretations. We do provide some interpretation but feel that further research is required to 
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ascertain these. We also hope that these correlations will inform the literature that jointly models 
labor supply, wage formation, and fertility for women. 
Another caveat is the inability to track marital status and school attendance with the NLSY79 
in the same manner that we track births and career progress. These are issues that are likely strongly 
related to wages, work experience accumulation, and fertility that would ideally be investigated as 
carefully. 
The next section reviews the literature to provide some context. The third section discusses 
the data and the construction of our main variables of interest. The fourth section is a presentation 
of our results. We conclude in the last section. 
 
3.2 Related Literature  
There is ample evidence that mothers earn less than women with no child. This motherhood 
wage penalty or “family gap” has been observed for both young women and older women, see for 
example Waldfogel (1997), Waldfogel (1998), and Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2009). This 
family gap is also found in the U.K. (Waldfogel and Harkness 2003) and Canada (Drolet 2002). 
There is however mixed evidence of a motherhood wage penalty in Australia, Germany and 
Scandinavian countries (Todd 2001; Gupta and Smith 2002; Waldfogel and Harkness 2003; 
Nielsen et al. 2004; Simonsen and Skipper 2006). 
The family gap literature has taken up the research concerned with documenting and 
interpreting estimated coefficients on children variables in hourly wage regressions. Hill (1979) 
found early that controls for the presence of children (and for marital status) act as proxies for 
measures of labor market productivity. As a result, she found that controlling for work experience 
and labor force attachment greatly reduces the motherhood wage penalty. This result has been 
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observed in all subsequent family gap studies. Another explanation is that mothers and non-
mothers somehow differ in their unobserved ability to earn. To deal with this unobserved 
heterogeneity researchers have use the fixed-effects estimator. Some find that it partially explains 
the motherhood wage penalty (Waldfogel 1998; Budig and England 2001) while others find that 
it leads to no effect of children on wages (Korenman and Neumark 1992; Gupta and Smith 2002). 
In addition to work experience and tenure, a number of papers consider in addition both time 
spent out of employment (Hill, 1979; Baum, 2002) and part-time employment (Waldfogel 1997; 
Joshi et al. 1999; Anderson et al. 2003). The interpretation is that being out of employment is 
associated with human capital depreciation, while part-time employment is usually associated with 
lower wages. Since part-time work and work interruptions are more prevalent among mothers, 
these variables are usually found to partially explain the motherhood wage penalty.  
Related to work interruptions is the focus of some papers on how long mothers take before 
going back to work after a birth and whether they return to the same job they held pre-birth. Shorter 
work interruptions following a birth (Lundberg and Rose 2000; Phipps et al. 2001) and returning 
to the same pre-birth job (Waldfogel 1998; Baum 2002) are associated with weaker motherhood 
wage penalties. One exception to this is Anderson et al. (2003) which find that women who return 
to work with very young children at home (two years old or less) have lower wages.  
Another important determinant of the family gap is the timing of the transition to motherhood. 
Women who make their transition to motherhood earlier in their career are found to have lower 
wages (Taniguchi 2000; Drolet 2002; Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel 2005). It is also found that 
the motherhood wage penalty varies by level of education whereas more educated mothers suffer 
from weaker wage penalties (Todd 2001; Anderson et al. 2003). These two issues are somehow 
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related as more educated mothers are on average older when they make their transition to 
motherhood. 
Another possible explanation for the motherhood wage penalty is that they may suffer from 
weaker wage growth either because mothers-to-be face lower rewards to improving labor market 
productivity, or because mothers have less time to do so. Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2009) 
finds no evidence that mothers suffer from lower wage growth. Similarly Waldfogel (1997) finds 
no differential returns to part-time work experience, more prevalent among mothers, relative to 
full-time work experience. However Gupta and Smith (2002) find some evidence that wage-
experience profiles are significantly flatter for mother with two or more children. Mincer and 
Polachek (1978) find that a longer work interruption following a birth is associated with weaker 
wage growth for women. 
In the empirical work that follows in sections 3.3 and 3.4 we address all of these possible 
explanations for the motherhood wage gap. 
 
3.3 NLSY79 Data 
We use data on wages, work experience, and household composition from the NLSY79. It is 
a longitudinal survey of a representative sample of 12,686 young men and women aged 14 to 21 
on December 31st 1978. It provides data on labor market experience, income, household and 
fertility for 6,283 women who were interviewed annually from 1979 to 1994 and every two years 
since then, with the last survey data available for 2010. In this study we focus on the 3,108 women 
of the cross-sectional sample of the NLSY79 and exclude the supplemental samples of blacks, 
Hispanics, and economically disadvantaged whites. My main wage regression sample includes 
multiple wage observations for 3,005 women. 
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We record the real hourly wage (in 2010 dollars) for the job held at that the time of each 
completed survey interview. If an individual holds more than one job, we select the job with the 
highest weekly hours of work. Only hourly wages above $4 and below $150 are considered. To 
exclude summer jobs and part-time student jobs, we start tracking wages by age 18 (age 21) for 
individuals whose final years of schooling is 12 or less (13 or more). 
The NLSY79 Work History Data contain weekly arrays that track employment status and 
hours worked starting January 1st 1978. We use these arrays to create actual work experience 
variables (total weeks worked, total hours worked) as well as time spent out of employment (total 
weeks out of employment) at each interview date. As with wages, we start tracking work 
experience and time out of employment at age 18 (age 21) for individuals whose final years of 
schooling is 12 or less (13 or more). 
For individuals who have children, the NLSY79 provides the date of birth and date of death 
(if applicable) of each child born to an individual. 13 After computing week of birth and death for 
each child, we can use the weekly arrays of employment status and hours worked to separate work 
experience accumulated with and without children. We do not count any child aged 18 or more, 
so that an individual is considered to have no child if all their children are 18 years old or more. 
Table 3.1 presents basic descriptive statistics for the sample. The first row represents the 
individuals’ distribution according to their final level of education. About 47% of women in the 
sample have high school or less (12 years of schooling or less), while 26% have some college (13 
to 15 years of schooling), and about 27% are college graduates (16 years of schooling or more). 
Note that the race distribution within each educational category suggests that white women are 
                                                 
13 Note that only month and year of birth and death are provided in the NLSY79. To identify the week these events 
took place we assume that birth and death always take place on the 15th of the month. 
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over-represented among college graduates, while minorities are over-represented among 
individuals with less than 16 years of schooling. About 80% of women in my sample have children 
at some point between 1979 and 2010. There is however a slightly negative correlation between 
motherhood status and educational achievement. At each survey we record the number of children 
aged 18 years old or less. Mothers have on average a maximum of two children across all these 
survey years. Mothers have on average their first child by the age 24 years old, but age at first birth 
is much higher for college graduates.  
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Figure 3.1 provides the age profile of hourly wages by educational achievement. As 
expected wage growth is stronger as education increases, leading to sizeable wage gaps as this 
cohort reaches the early forties.  
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Figure 3.1 Women Age Profile of Hourly Wage by Education (with 95% Confidence) 
 
Figure 3.2 graphs the age profile of accumulated hours of work by educational 
achievement. These profiles are fairly similar across schooling levels, but the more educated 
workers have steeper profiles, suggesting that they have higher annual hours of work.  
Figure 3.2 Women Age Profile of Accumulative Hours of Work by Education (with 95% 
Confidence) 
 
Figure 3.3 presents age profiles of number of children for mothers by educational 
achievement. The profile for women with 16 years of schooling or more is clearly to the right of 
less educated women, consistent with their higher average age at first birth. It is also noteworthy 
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that these profiles start decreasing as children turn 18 years old when mothers reach their late 
thirties and early forties. 
Figure 3.3 Women Age Profile of Number of Children for Mothers by Education (with 
95% Confidence) 
 
 
 
3.4 Wage Profile Analysis 
3.4.1 The Returns to Work Experience and Motherhood 
The main analysis presented here is based on a sample of about 38,500 log-wage 
observations for 3,005 women. 14 This is an unbalanced panel with an average of 13 log-wage 
observations per individual, ranging from a minimum of one observation to a maximum of 24 
observations. Figure 3.4 presents wage-age profiles based on the age at which a mother had her 
first child. Here we distinguish between mothers whose age at first birth was less than 25, and 
those who had their first child after the age of 25.  
 
                                                 
14 Out of 3,108 women in the NLSY79 cross-sectional sample. 
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Figure 3.4 Women Age Profile of Hourly Wage by Age at First Birth (with 95% Confidence 
Interval) 
 
Panel A shows that mothers who have their first child later in their career (green line) have a 
wage progression very similar to that of non-mothers (blue line). Women who become mothers at 
an early age (red line) have much slower wage growth. Panels B to D present the same wage 
profiles separately for each level of schooling. They reveal weaker wage growth for early mothers 
as seen in Panel A but the distinction between early mothers and other women are more muted. 
This suggests that the differences in wage profiles found in Panel A are in part due to compositional 
effects: early mothers are more likely to be less educated workers with weaker wage growth 
whereas late mothers are more likely to be more educated workers with strong wage growth. It is 
worth noting that average wages in the early career are very similar across all panels of Figure 3.4. 
The weaker wage growth of early mothers is consistent with their slower accumulation of work 
experience.  
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Figure 3.5 Women Age Profile of Accumulated Hours of Work by Age at First Birth (with 
95% Confidence Interval) 
 
Figure 3.5 shows that their age profile of accumulated hours of work is consistently below 
that of late mothers and non-mothers. But these profiles also suggest that late mothers of all 
schooling levels decrease their labor supply in their late twenties and early thirties. This would 
explain why wage profiles for late mothers in Figure 3.4 seem to flatten in the late twenties and 
early thirties. Our analysis indicates so far that wage differentials between mothers and non-
mothers are almost non-existent in the early career. However, we find that the wage growth of 
mothers, especially early mothers, is weaker and leads to a gap in average wage between mothers 
and non-mothers. Part of this slower wage growth is due to mothers accumulating less work 
experience. 
We investigate further whether the accumulation of work experience explains the differences 
in wage profiles of non-mothers, early mothers and late mothers. Table 3.2 contains estimate of a 
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fixed-effects wage regression that controls simultaneously for work experience (measured by 
accumulated hours of work), years of tenure with a specific employer, and years since labor market 
entry. 15 As expected we find the returns to work experience, tenure, and years since labor market 
entry are positive and decreasing. In the early career, a year of full-time time work (about 2,000 
hours of work) is associated with a wage growth of about 3.4%.  
Table 3.2 The Returns to Work Experience for Non-Mothers, Early Mothers and Late 
Mothers 
 
Although columns two to four reveals that this returns varies based on years of schooling, 
with college graduates enjoying a 4.6% wage increase in their first year of full-time work. Wage 
growth after a year at the same job is about 3%, and the first year since labor market entry is 
                                                 
15 Given our assumption that workers with no college (at least some college) enter the market at age 18 (age 21), 
years since labor market entry is just age minus 18 (21). 
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associated with about 2.6% wage growth. We also allow the returns to work experience to vary 
based on whether mothers had their child before or after the age of 25. These interactions should 
be statistically insignificant if wage profile differences are fully explained by work experience 
profiles. But what we find is that across all schooling levels, mothers who have their first child 
after the age of 25 enjoy higher returns to work experience. At the same time mothers who have 
their child before age 25 enjoy lower returns to work experience, although this seems to be mostly 
an issue for early mothers with a college degree. These estimates imply that within the 0 to 50,000 
accumulated hours of work range (in which 95% of our sample is located) the average quadratic 
wage-experience profile of late mothers is above that of non-mothers, which is itself above that of 
early mothers, for all schooling levels. 
Table 3.2 also reveals an apparent wage penalty associated with becoming a mother. Indeed 
this wage penalty seems especially large for late mothers. However it is worth noting that (in 
results not shown here) we find similar wage penalties when we exclude non-mothers from the 
estimation sample. We believe this is due to the fact that in a fixed-effects model these penalties 
are identified off of workers in our sample who make the transition into motherhood (in the early 
career when wages are lower and wage growth is strong) and out of motherhood (in the late career 
when wages are higher and wage growth is weaker). We could also obtain similar results if mothers 
make the transition into motherhood when hit with bad labor market shocks that translate into 
lower wages.  
In Table 3.3 we investigate whether the higher returns to work experience for late mothers 
is related to the timing of the transition to motherhood. To do so, we distinguish work experience 
of late mothers based on whether it was acquired before or after the first birth.  
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Table 3.3 The Returns to Work Experience before and after the Transition to Motherhood 
 
In Panel a, the coefficient for hours of work accumulated by late mothers before the first birth 
is found positive and statistically significant for all schooling levels. This suggests that when 
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comparing the wage of two mothers with the same total amount of work experience, we would 
find that the wage is higher for the mother who has waited the longest before having her first child. 
This is compounded by the fact that we find the returns to hours worked by late mothers after the 
first birth to be lower, especially for mothers who have at least 13 years of schooling. It could be 
argued that hours of work before the first birth capture the stronger wage growth in the early career. 
We investigate this in Panel b where we differentiate work experience based on whether it was 
acquired before the age of 25, or from ages 25 to 35. If returns to work experience are higher 
during the early career, then the coefficients associated with these two measures of work 
experience should be positive. And we do find that work experience has a higher return for workers 
of all schooling levels if it is acquired before age 25. But we still find that late mothers experience 
stronger wage growth before their transition to motherhood, although the coefficients appear 
smaller than those found in Panel a. 
3.4.2 Occupational Task Requirements and Wage Growth 
We next investigate whether differences in wage growth can be explained by non-mothers, 
early mothers, and late mothers having careers progressions that take them through different 
occupations. Past literature has differentiated jobs on the basis of occupation codes. We instead 
follow (Ingram and Neumann 2006) and (Poletaev and Robinson 2006) in describing occupations 
as a vector of skill requirements. In our case occupations are described by how much cognitive, 
interpersonal, motor, and strength skills they involve. These skill requirements are not available in 
the NLSY79 but we can match its 1970 census occupational classification codes to the Dictionary 
of Occupational Titles (DOT). The DOT describes a large number of jobs on the basis of more 
than fifty different characteristics categorized as worker functions, educational requirements, 
temperaments, and aptitudes used for a job. We apply principal component analysis on four 
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mutually exclusive subsets of these characteristics to build our cognitive, interpersonal, motor, and 
strength skill occupational requirements. As an example, surgeons would have relatively high 
values for cognitive and motor skill requirements, whereas salespersons would have relatively high 
interpersonal skill requirement. 
Figure 3.6 Average Predicted Women Age Profile of Occupational Skill Requirements 
 
We regress these four different skill requirements on linear and quadratic terms in 
accumulated work experience, years since leaving the labor market and tenure, as well as 
interactions of these variables with indicator variables for early mothers and late mothers. The 
average age profile predicted by this model for each skill requirement is plotted in Figure 3.6. They 
show that all women see their cognitive and interpersonal skills increase throughout their careers, 
whereas motor and strength skills tend to decrease with career progression. Late mothers have on 
average the age profiles of late mothers are very similar to that of non-mothers. We also see that 
late mothers appear to move up the cognitive and interpersonal skill ladders at a faster rate, and to 
lose motor skill requirement at a faster rate. Therefore if cognitive and interpersonal (strength) 
skills are associated with higher wage, then we would expect stronger wage growth for late 
mothers.  
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Table 3.4 The Returns to Work Experience and Occupational Skill Requirements 
 
Table 3.4 shows that these skill requirements are related to wages. Women who hold job with 
higher cognitive and strength requirements tend to earn more. However jobs that require more 
interpersonal skills, for the same levels of cognitive and strength skills, are associated with lower 
wages. Despite this effect of skill requirement on wages we still find that late mothers enjoy higher 
returns to work experience. Although late mothers climbing faster the cognitive skill ladder could 
explain their stronger wage growth, their faster climb of the interpersonal skill ladder should 
tamper this effect. As a result we still find that the interaction between accumulated work 
experience and being a late mother is positive and statistically significant at all schooling levels. 
3.4.3 Work Interruptions and Wage Growth 
We then study the relationship between work interruptions (time spent out of employment) 
and wages of women. These work interruptions obviously lead to less work experience 
accumulation, so our accumulated work experience variable should already account for that effect. 
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However work interruptions might also lead to loss in specific human capital, and these losses 
might be heavier as more time is spent out of employment. If non-mothers and late mothers spend 
less time out of employment, they suffer less from this loss of specific human capital relative to 
early mothers, and may look like they enjoy stronger wage growth if work interruptions are not 
accounted for. 
Table 3.5 The Returns to Work Experience and Weeks Spent Out of Employment 
 
Table 3.5 shows that time spent out of employment is associated with significantly lower 
wages for all women at all levels of schooling. It is interesting to note however that this effect is 
less negative mothers relative to non-mothers. This may be due to mothers having a higher 
reservation wage and leaving unemployment only when they find a job with a sufficiently high 
wage. It is also worth noting that accounting for weeks of unemployment seems to make the 
indicator variables for having at least one child insignificant. So it seems that part of the negative 
effect of having children on wages that we found in Table 3.2 can be explained by mothers 
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spending more time out of employment. This is in line with results presented in Baum (2002). We 
however still find differential returns to work experience despite controlling for time out of 
employment. Early mothers experience lower returns to work experience whereas late mothers 
have higher (lower) returns to experience before (after) their transition to motherhood. 
To understand better the how time spent out of employment affects the wages of mothers we 
study how birth related work interruptions impact the wage and occupational skill requirements 
upon returning to the labor market. In this section we rely on a sample of periods out of 
employment observed around the time of any birth. For any of these periods we record the hourly 
wage and skill requirements before and after the interruption. We also record the length, the birth 
order, and at what time during the career it took place. Mothers who have more than one birth have 
multiple observations in this sample.  
Table 3.6 Birth Related Work Interruptions and Average Changes in Wages and 
Occupational Skill Requirements 
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We first report the impact of birth related work interruptions on wages and occupational skill 
requirements in Table 3.6. We find that birth related work interruption lead to mothers going back 
to work with lower wages on average. But this negative impact is felt mainly by late mothers and 
mothers with a college degree. Work interruptions are associated with drops in cognitive and motor 
occupational skill requirements, and increases in interpersonal and strength skill requirements. 
In Table 3.7 at the determinants wage changes following a birth related work interruption. We 
find that the most important determinants in explaining the change in wage following a work 
interruption is the change in cognitive and interpersonal skill requirements.  
Table 3.7 Birth Related Work Interruptions and the Impact of Occupational Skill 
Requirement Changes on Wages 
 
Work interruptions associated with a decrease in cognitive skills lead to significant wage 
losses for mothers. At the same time, increases in the interpersonal, whereas decreases in 
interpersonal skills are associated with higher wages. These results are consistent with those of 
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Table 3.4 where we find that a higher (lower) cognitive (interpersonal) skill requirement is 
associated with a higher hourly wage. Table 3.7 also shows that the length of the work interruption 
seems to have little significant impact on wages once changes in skill requirements are accounted 
for. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this paper we study the family gap, the wage penalty associated with motherhood. Our basic 
raw age-wage profiles show that the family gap is insignificant in the early career. In fact late 
mothers and non-mothers have very similar hourly wage and that the family gap gradually appears 
in the mid-twenties, whereas the profile of early mothers grows much slower and is below that of 
other mothers quite early on. 
We show that there are two components to explaining the wage penalty associated with 
motherhood. First, mothers accumulate work experience at a slower rate once they transition into 
motherhood. Second, mothers’ returns to experience differ from that of non-mothers. Early 
mothers’ returns to experience are lower throughout their career. Late mothers’ returns to work 
experience are stronger (weaker) before (after) their transition to motherhood. This is how they 
can maintain their wage relative to non-mothers after their transition to motherhood despite their 
slower accumulation of experience after that transition. We show that these differentials in returns 
to work experience are robust to accounting for differences in occupational skill requirements, and 
costly losses in specific human capital due to time spent out of employment. 
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Appendix A. Technical Notes for Chapter 1 
With Transfer Program 
Under individual taxation with intra-family transfer, the individual utility functions for husband 
and wife are given by  
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The husband and the wife solve their own maximization of altruistic utility function, which is 
written as fmm UUZ  and mff UUZ  , respectively 
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Comparative static analysis indicates that the impact of intra-household transfer and the degree of 
altruism on each spouse’s labor supply and individual tax rates are given by the following: 
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Under joint taxation with intra-family transfer, the individual utility functions for husband and 
wife are given by, 
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Husband and wife solve their own maximization of altruistic utility function iii UUZ   (for
fmi , ) by using the first order condition: 
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Similarly, comparative static analysis investigates the impact of intra-household transfer and the 
degree of altruism on individual’s labor supply and tax rate: 
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Individual i‘s labor supply strictly decreases as the degree of altruism if his or her marginal rate 
of substitution between market work and home production is greater and equal to which of his or 
her spouse’s.  
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While for type 2 household, the marginal tax rate increases with a higher share of transfer is given 
to the husband if his marginal rate of substitution between market work and home production is 
higher than which of his spouse’s. The marginal tax rate is reversely related to the degree of 
altruism, under joint taxation. 
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Without Transfer Program 
For individual taxation, the individual utility functions for husband and wife are given by the 
following, when there is no intra-family transfer between them:  
;
2
1
)()1( 2mfmmm
I
m
m gggLwU    
.
2
1
)()1( 2ffmff
I
f
f gggLwU    
Individual optimizes his or her time between work and home production to maximize the altruistic 
utility function, which is specified as iii UUZ    for fmi , . The solution of optimal labor 
supply is given by following: 
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The optimal individual tax rates are: 
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For joint taxation, similarly, the altruistic functions for both husband and wife are:  
;
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The solution to each spouse’s optimal time allocation between market and home production is 
given  
;
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The solution to the government’s problem is  
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Appendix B. Tables for Chapter 2 
Summary Statistics of Log Earnings for Low Privatized Region 
  1995 2002 
  Male Female Male Female 
Age Groups:     
  16-25 5.621 5.509 6.133 6.035 
  (0.660) (0.761) (0.631) (0.511) 
  26-35 6.010 5.907 6.509 6.377 
  (0.556) (0.593) (0.554) (0.613) 
  36-45 6.225 6.113 6.643 6.473 
  (0.466) (0.482) (0.488) (0.527) 
  46-60 6.355 6.145 6.678 6.522 
  (0.484) (0.593) (0.511) (0.512) 
Marital Status:     
  Married 6.231 6.037 6.637 6.456 
  (0.503) (0.561) (0.505) (0.550) 
  Others 5.657 5.610 6.185 6.205 
  (0.682) (0.785) (0.644) (0.594) 
Nature of Jobs:     
  Permanent 6.209 6.053 6.685 6.591 
  (0.528) (0.554) (0.490) (0.474) 
  Temporary 5.975 5.610 6.185 6.205 
  (0.638) (0.725) (0.576) (0.581) 
Levels of Education:     
  College and above 6.414 6.300 6.930 6.769 
  (0.445) (0.422) (0.467) (0.486) 
  Professional School 6.210 6.133 6.671 6.563 
  (0.476) (0.581) (0.513) (0.499) 
  High School and Below 6.083 5.884 6.452 6.224 
  (0.610) (0.608) (0.514) (0.561) 
Ownership Sector:     
  State Sector 6.200 6.049 6.658 6.511 
  (0.526) (0.581) (0.497) (0.529) 
 Non-State Sector 5.830 5.665 6.393 6.217 
  (0.610) (0.608) (0.604) (0.583) 
Occupation:     
  Professional or technician 6.310 6.213 6.780 6.684 
  (0.451) (0.482) (0.530) (0.468) 
  Director of government 6.374 6.327 6.837 6.778 
  (0.383) (0.418) (0.402) (0.271) 
  Office Stuff 6.110 6.004 6.622 6.499 
  (0.513) (0.526) (0.465) (0.509) 
  Labor 6.015 5.796 6.381 6.168 
  (0.651) (0.666) (0.539) (0.561) 
Industry:     
  Manufacturing 6.110 5.932 6.451 6.242 
  (0.606) (0.624) (0.494) (0.541) 
  Commerce and Retail  6.210 6.133 6.206 6.081 
  (0.476) (0.581) (0.656) (0.607) 
  Education, Culture and Art 6.414 6.300 6.897 6.677 
  (0.445) (0.422) (0.429) (0.418) 
  Public Service 6.210 6.133 6.763 6.674 
  (0.476) (0.581) (0.372) 6.674 
  Financial and Other Service 6.261 6.053 6.635 6.482 
  (0.512) (0.630) (0.570) (0.575) 
Note: The samples consists of individuals aged 16 and 60. Means and standard deviations for the male and female 
workers, and gender mean earnings gaps, are measured in log points. Data source: CHIP 1995, 2002 and 2007. 
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Summary Statistics of Log Earnings for Moderate Privatized Region 
  1995 2002 2007 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Age Groups:       
  16-25 5.930 5.854 6.228 6.113 6.324 6.464 
  (0.611) (0.722) (0.603) (0.720) (0.503) (0.490) 
  26-35 6.299 6.163 6.550 6.371 6.888 6.612 
  (0.556) (0.530) (0.539) (0.574) (0.599) (0.580) 
  36-45 6.457 6.299 6.654 6.395 6.751 6.490 
  (0.612) (0.525) (0.553) (0.576) (0.682) (0.659) 
  46-60 6.549 6.163 6.686 6.487 6.743 6.346 
  (0.503) (0.699) (0.569) (0.618) (0.619) (0.599) 
Marital Status:       
  Married 6.470 6.215 6.662 6.416 6.781 6.492 
  (0.560) (0.590) (0.560) (0.587) (0.632) (0.638) 
  Others 5.959 5.980 6.356 6.210 6.554 6.501 
  (0.648) (0.635) (0.615) (0.691) (0.780) (0.524) 
Nature of Jobs:       
  Permanent 6.444 6.239 6.741 6.591 6.965 6.789 
  (0.598) (0.586) (0.547) (0.540) (0.625) (0.511) 
  Temporary 6.242 6.036 6.481 6.207 6.596 6.346 
  (0.575) (0.624) (0.575) (0.603) (0.645) (0.617) 
Levels of Education:       
  College and above 6.634 6.374 7.000 6.889 7.148 6.944 
  (0.533) (0.546) (0.552) (0.497) (0.526) (0.488) 
  Professional School 6.481 6.413 6.726 6.528 6.785 6.599 
  (0.579) (0.559) (0.537) (0.609) (0.687) (0.570) 
  High School and Below 6.322 6.079 6.487 6.220 6.535 6.222 
  (0.603) (0.592) (0.550) (0.553) (0.605) (0.578) 
Ownership Sector:       
  State Sector 6.425 6.237 6.722 6.519 6.825 6.674 
  (0.597) (0.606) (0.544) (0.569) (0.666) (0.554) 
 Non-State Sector 6.299 6.058 6.447 6.186 6.684 6.372 
  (0.592) (0.567) (0.586) (0.604) (0.651) (0.632) 
Occupation:       
  Professional or technician 6.480 6.398 6.806 6.644 6.945 6.781 
  (0.504) (0.495) (0.528) (0.549) (0.608) (0.537) 
  Director of government 6.664 6.619 6.890 6.792 7.077 6.861 
  (0.497) (0.645) (0.530) (0.632) (0.537) (0.632) 
  Office Stuff 6.444 6.238 6.644 6.501 6.814 6.635 
  (0.676) (0.632) (0.530) (0.587) (0.587) (0.596) 
  Labor 6.227 6.014 6.453 6.183 6.529 6.262 
  (0.599) (0.571) (0.563) (0.558) (0.679) (0.549) 
Industry:       
  Manufacturing 6.342 6.097 6.542 6.323 6.764 6.490 
  (0.589) (0.538) (0.558) (0.535) (0.547) (0.549) 
  Commerce and Retail  6.289 6.086 6.346 6.113 6.520 6.264 
  (0.656) (0.548) (0.563) (0.568) (0.629) (0.668) 
  Education, Culture and Art 6.543 6.394 6.979 6.642 6.996 6.742 
  (0.520) (0.523) (0.514) (0.587) (0.484) (0.487) 
  Public Service 6.570 6.386 6.830 6.701 6.893 6.765 
  (0.541) (0.860) (0.527) (0.547) (0.600) (0.524) 
  Financial and Other Service 6.532 6.344 6.661 6.403 6.725 6.485 
  (0.591) (0.646) (0.563) (0.643) (0.762) (0.637) 
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Summary Statistics of Log Earnings for High Privatized Region 
 
  2002 2007 
  Male Female Male Female 
Age Groups:     
  16-25 6.877 6.868 6.837 6.793 
  (0.581) (0.663) (0.536) (0.533) 
  26-35 7.191 6.978 7.227 6.985 
  (0.615) (0.590) (0.661) (0.621) 
  36-45 7.223 6.929 7.223 6.796 
  (0.576) (0.568) (0.702) (0.665) 
  46-60 7.174 7.045 7.031 6.619 
  (0.526) (0.553) (0.676) (0.648) 
Marital Status:     
  Married 7.212 6.976 7.156 6.822 
  (0.545) (0.558) (0.683) (0.659) 
  Others 6.953 6.922 6.947 6.873 
  (0.613) (0.675) (0.670) (0.590) 
Nature of Jobs:     
  Permanent 7.240 7.126 7.264 7.045 
  (0.534) (0.545) (0.609) (0.636) 
  Temporary 7.109 6.861 7.050 6.762 
  (0.582) (0.575) (0.711) (0.637) 
Levels of Education:     
  College and above 7.533 7.398 7.531 7.301 
  (0.583) (0.498) (0.683) (0.676) 
  Professional School 7.287 7.106 7.203 6.986 
  (0.578) (0.543) (0.651) (0.573) 
  High School and Below 7.022 6.799 6.928 6.556 
  (0.493) (0.555) (0.631) (0.556) 
Ownership Sector:     
  State Sector 7.209 7.047 7.223 6.990 
  (0.540) (0.543) (0.653) (0.647) 
 Non-State Sector 7.103 6.842 7.066 6.757 
  (0.598) (0.609) (0.698) (0.636) 
Occupation:     
  Professional or technician 7.390 7.209 7.307 7.140 
  (0.530) (0.544) (0.636) (0.666) 
  Director of government 7.489 7.383 7.563 7.186 
  (0.539) (0.553) (0.655) (0.583) 
  Office Stuff 7.248 7.031 7.156 6.940 
  (0.497) (0.484) (0.675) (0.609) 
  Labor 6.951 6.705 6.941 6.624 
  (0.486) (0.563) (0.638) (0.576) 
Industry:     
  Manufacturing 7.092 6.917 7.047 6.741 
  (0.497) (0.567) (0.674) (0.656) 
  Commerce and Retail  7.054 6.821 7.043 6.701 
  (0.573) (0.663) (0.707) (0.609) 
  Education, Culture and Art 7.333 7.170 7.252 7.011 
  (0.480) (0.531) (0.587) (0.633) 
  Public Service 7.342 7.027 7.362 6.996 
  (0.566) (0.495) (0.677) (0.608) 
  Financial and Other Service 7.197 7.005 7.156 6.883 
  (0.611) (0.569) (0.686) (0.655) 
